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Article 
The Death of the Firm 
June Carbone† & Nancy Levit†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings 
to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the 
rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, 
and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or 
another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are ex-
tended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people.1 
In the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lob-
by—and more generally in corporate and employment law—the 
firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis. We 
use the term “firm” in this Article in the sense that Ronald 
Coase did to describe a form of business organization that or-
ders the production of goods and services through use of a sys-
tem internal to the enterprise rather than through the use of 
independent contractors.2 The idea of an “entity” in this sense 
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Downs, Max Eichner, Martha Fineman, Barb Glesner Fines, Claire Hill, Brett 
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support. Copyright © 2017 by June Carbone & Nancy Levit. 
 1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 2. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–93 
(1937). The term “corporation,” in contrast, refers to a particular type of busi-
ness organization with a corporate charter. Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating 
Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2014). Thus, while all corpora-
tions are in some sense “firms,” not all firms are corporations. For other dis-
cussions of the legal significance of the firm concept, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001–33 
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refers to an institution that is greater than the sum of its parts, 
one that has a legal existence, recognizable identity, and loyal-
ty claims independent of the individuals who may own it or 
control it at any given time.3 Popular accounts sometimes read 
Hobby Lobby and similar decisions as conferring rights on the 
entity and thus enhancing the institutional character of the 
claims, insisting, as presidential candidate Mitt Romney did in 
2012, that “[c]orporations are people, my friend.”4 
As Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby makes 
clear, however, reading these opinions as enhancing the insti-
tutional character of the rights conferred would be a mistake. 
Instead, these decisions are the culmination of a decades-long 
attack on the reification of the corporation and an assault on 
the very notion of corporate interests separate from the narrow-
ly defined interests of a company’s immediate owners. These 
decisions, even as they recognize corporate First Amendment 
claims, erode the status of the corporation as an entity that im-
poses institutional constraints on executive freedom of action, 
has institutional obligations to its employees, or can be held in-
stitutionally accountable as a community citizen. Within this 
jurisprudence, the corporation becomes, as Justice Alito ob-
serves, a means to an end,5 no different from the corporate jet 
or the supply contract with a Chinese subsidiary. Thus, Hobby 
Lobby and the line of cases it represents signals the “death of 
the firm” as an important component of legal analysis across a 
variety of fields. 
This Article is the first to consider the implications of this 
ideological shift in the treatment of the firm with respect to the 
corresponding construction of business entities as appropriate 
partners for the government in advancing public purposes. Fol-
lowing Hobby Lobby, many scholars have questioned the deci-
 
(summarizing the literature on the status of the corporation); Timothy P. 
Glynn, Taking the Employer out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage 
and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 203 (2011) (describing the impact of firm disaggregation on 
employees). 
 3. This idea of an entity that supplies identity and commands loyalty is 
rooted in media theory and remains influential in the management literature 
as a way to motivate employees. See infra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
 4. Maureen Dowd, Power to the Corporation!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, 
at SR11. 
 5. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VAN-
ISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECON-
OMY 77–79 (2016) (describing the difficulty of holding corporations accountable 
for actions taken within their supply chains). 
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sion on three grounds. First, First Amendment scholars have 
challenged the Court’s conclusion that a corporation can exer-
cise religious rights and, if so, in what circumstances.6 Second, 
constitutional scholars have explored the status of corporate 
entities, with some arguing that corporations are creations of 
the State, and thus can be defined and regulated in whatever 
ways the State chooses, and others arguing that corporations 
have constitutional standing that imposes some limits on gov-
ernment action.7 Third, corporate scholars have revisited the 
issue of management fiduciary duties, questioning whether 
managers must seek to advance the firm’s commercial interests 
or whether they can promote other values, such as religious or 
civic interests.8 What all three critiques have in common is that 
they assume that a system of employer-provided, government-
subsidized health care (and implicitly other benefits) is appro-
priate. 
This Article takes a different approach. It takes seriously 
the Supreme Court embrace of the firm as a mere fiction9 that 
 
 6. Besides questioning the reasoning of the Hobby Lobby decision itself, 
these critiques raise two additional questions that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. The first is who defines the religious stance of a corporate entity. The 
logic of the Hobby Lobby majority suggests that the question is a matter of 
contract among the owners. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for 
Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 790–91 (2015) (discussing the ability of 
corporate officers to advance ends other than profit maximization). Hobby 
Lobby is unusual in that it is a closely held corporation, with a religious 
statement of purposes in its corporate charter, and it is therefore not clear how 
many other entities will thus be able to assert such a purpose. Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2765–66. The second broader issue is whether commercial actors 
generally can impose their religious preferences on others who do not share 
such preferences in the context of commercial decisions. See Elizabeth Sepper, 
Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 232 (2015) 
(discussing interaction of religious liberty and anti-discrimination law). 
 7. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 2 (summarizing the literature on the status 
of the corporation and arguing that the issue has never been definitely re-
solved); Padfield, supra note 2, at 331–32 (arguing that corporations are crea-
tions of the State, and thus the government can impose conditions on the 
grant of corporate charters). 
 8. See McDonnell, supra note 6. 
 9. The firm is not, however, a complete fiction as it is an entity chartered 
by law with the power to enter into contracts and perform other binding acts. 
See Lynn Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
685, 705 n.61 (2015) (“Even thoughtful observers sometimes describe corpora-
tions as ‘legal fictions.’ Any good lawyer knows this phrase is an oxymoron. 
There is nothing fictional about legal institutions, which exercise enormous 
influence over human beings. That corporations are invisible does not make 
them fictional or unreal. Gravity, too, is invisible.”). In a similar sense, corpo-
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serves no purpose and has no obligations other than the inter-
ests of its owners, and considers the consequences of that shift 
for the advancement of public purposes. It locates the Court’s 
endorsement of this limited conception of the firm in two long-
standing changes that reinforce each other. First, an ideological 
shift rejected mid-twentieth-century managerialism, which had 
treated firms as more than the sum of their parts, and replaced 
it with agency-cost theory that treated the firm as a mere nex-
us of contracts.10 The agency-cost movement accused the mana-
gerial era firms of complacency, celebrated the corporate takeo-
ver market of the 1980s, embraced “pay for performance” 
schemes that greatly increased executive compensation, and 
today cheers on the activist investors who focus corporate at-
tention on maximizing short-term share prices.11 In this per-
spective, the owners of a privately held company like Hobby 
Lobby are free to treat the company (and its employees) howev-
er they like, and large publicly traded corporations, with thou-
sands of employees, serve no interests other than to maximize 
the return to their shareholders. This ideological movement 
marked the “death of the firm” as a subject of importance in 
management theory and in the legal regulation of corporate in-
terests. 
Second, an era of technological change and globalization 
has replaced the brick-and-mortar behemoths of the industrial 
era with more network-like commercial entities. This second 
change marks the rise of companies that continually reconsti-
tute themselves. They change product lines, spin off underper-
forming divisions and acquire new ones, employ an ever-
changing cast of millennial “knowledge nomads”12 in their 
 
rations may voluntarily assume contractual obligations to their employees, it 
is just that these obligations do not follow automatically from the nature of the 
business entity. 
 10. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, The Misapplication of Mr. Mi-
chael Jensen: How Agency Theory Brought down the Economy and Why It 
Might Again, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 29–32 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010), 
http://www.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dobbin/files/the_misapplication_of_mr._ 
michael_jensen_dobbin_and_jung.pdf (summarizing agency-cost theory). 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 178–79, 199, 246–51. 
 12. Mallory Stark, High Turnover: Should You Care?, HARV. BUS. WK. 
(July 26, 2004), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4277.html; see also PWC, TALENT 
MOBILITY: 2020 AND BEYOND 19 (2012) (noting that among millennials in 
business and technology, thirty-eight percent are “always actively on the look-
out for other opportunities,” while another forty-three percent are not actively 
looking, “but would be open to offers”). 
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skilled ranks, replace the less skilled with a contingent work-
force (or robots), and relocate factories, warehouses, and head-
quarters to the countries or regions with the lowest costs, best 
quality, and most attractive tax incentives.13 Thus, a furniture 
company can sell sofas made with hardwoods that come from 
Thailand one year and Malaysia the next, with engineered fi-
berboard filling in. The sofa’s heralded “Italian leather” may be 
processed in Italy, but the hides come from Northern Europe—
or Argentina. The leather and the hardwoods may then travel 
across the globe with assembly in the Ukraine or China or Vi-
etnam as labor market conditions shift, and robots that can 
substitute for the workers involved in riveting, shipping, or 
warehouse supply. A brand such as “Natuzzi” may signal a 
guarantee of quality, but its owners, employees, distribution 
networks, and even corporate headquarters can shift over 
time.14 
These two movements reinforce each other: the ideological 
change contributed to a management focus on shorter-term and 
more reductionist objectives while technological change and 
globalization have created more opportunities for the flexible 
and the nimble. Taken together, both change the relationships 
between employers and employees, and both call into question 
the use of the firm to supply basic necessities such as health 
care and pensions, and to serve as suitable partners for public 
purposes. 
In this Article, we document the “death of the firm,” that 
is, the ideological shift from celebration of the firm as bigger 
 
 13. Within the United States, these trends tend to focus on the movement 
abroad. Jim Tankersley, America’s Top Execs Seem Ready To Give up on U.S. 
Workers, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
storyline/wp/2014/09/11/americas-top-execs-seem-ready-to-give-up-on-u-s 
-workers. For example, one study of Harvard Business School alumni, many of 
whom are at the helm of major corporations, showed that fifty-six of those sur-
veyed recounted instances of moving one thousand or more jobs abroad and 
zero cases of moving that number of jobs from abroad into the United States. 
Id. Jobs that move abroad, however, do not necessarily stay permanently in 
the country to which the move occurs. 
 14. For an examination of these trends, see LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE 
CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Gregory Elliott trans., 2007) 
(discussing major changes in capitalist systems, including subdelegation). In 
the nineties, Business Week heralded these developments as the rise of the 
“virtual corporation,” which operated as a “network of independent compa-
nies—suppliers, customers, even erstwhile rivals—linked by information tech-
nology . . . [with] neither central office nor organization chart.” John Byrne, 
The Virtual Corporation, BUS. WK. (Feb. 7, 1993), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/1993-02-07/the-virtual-corporation. 
  
968 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:963 
 
than the sum of its parts to denigration of the firm as a “fiction” 
that obscures analysis of the human interests at stake, and the 
corresponding change from the large, stable corporations of the 
industrial era to the more dynamic networks of the technologi-
cal age. We argue that just as the State of the industrial era 
grew in response to the concentrated power of manufacturing 
firms so, too, must the State of the technological era comple-
ment and offset the new concentrations of power and better 
equip workers to meet the challenges of the new era. 
In Part I, we trace the rise of the corporation in America, 
examining the changing relationships between management 
and labor, and between firms and the State. This Part shows 
how corporate theory, even as it develops over time, keeps com-
ing back to the same issues: the challenges of changing labor 
needs and the destructive tendencies of unchecked concentra-
tions of power. 
Part II explains the forces that have changed the ideologi-
cal and material treatment of commercial production. This Part 
describes the rise of the agency-cost theorists of the seventies, 
the ideological assault they inspired on the idea of the firm, and 
the changing impact of executive compensation and financial 
markets on corporate objectives, culminating in the death of 
the firm of the industrial era and the rise of more fluid corpo-
rate networks. 
Part III examines the implications of these changed rela-
tionships—between labor and management, between corpora-
tions and government—for the treatment of the firm. Hobby 
Lobby, in describing the corporation as no more than a vehicle 
to advance other interests, changes the assumptions on which 
public-private partnerships are based. Public subsidization of 
employer-provided health care arose in an era in which secure 
employment with a large employer was the norm. The recogni-
tion of the rights of owners to impose idiosyncratic limits on 
employee access to state benefits raises the issue of whether 
the State should subsidize employer benefits at all. Instead, the 
logic of the decision suggests that the ultimate goal of health 
care reform should be to eliminate the employer role altogether; 
health care can be provided directly to individuals either 
through exchanges that connect private companies with indi-
viduals or through a single-payer system. Employer-provided 
health care has become an anachronism. 
The latter portion of Part III analyzes what such recreation 
of the relationship between State, firm, and individual might 
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look like more generally. Unions—and the stable, well-
compensated employment contracts they championed—arose in 
response to the nature of the firms of the industrial age. In an 
era of commercial entities as networks that continually reform 
in response to changing circumstances, the appropriate re-
sponse may be to reconsider the sources of worker resilience 
and autonomy. Just as Hobby Lobby’s owners are free to im-
pose their religious values on the terms of corporate health 
care, so too should Hobby Lobby’s employees be able to obtain 
health care and other forms of social insurance on terms inde-
pendent of their employment. The rebuilding of the terms of ex-
change in the information age should be reciprocal and empow-
er individuals on both ends of these transactions to become 
more nimble and adept players in a changing global market-
place. 
As firms change from entities with stable identities, in-
vestments in long-term employees, and community-based 
commitments to ever-shifting networks designed to maximize 
the interests of the transient few,15 the opportunities they offer 
for public-private partnerships change. The new partnerships 
should be based on flexibility rather than stability, and they 
should promote individual resilience rather than assume that 
employment alone will address long-term worker needs.16 The 
idea of the firm, at least at the height of the managerial era in 
mid-twentieth-century America, assumed that business, em-
ployee, and public interests overlapped. In an era that dismiss-
es firms as no more than vehicles to advance their owners’ nar-
rowly defined or idiosyncratic interests, the sources of 
individual flexibility and security also need to shift from within 
to outside private business structures. While the holding of 
Hobby Lobby is limited to closely held companies, its dictum is 
far-reaching: it marks the end of the firm as an instrument of 
collective well-being. 
 
 15. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 122–24 (describing the move toward more 
transient employment); Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance in a 
Networked Age, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 713–15, 721–26 (2015). 
 16. For discussion of the idea of resilience, see Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 
251, 269–73 (2010). 
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I.  THE RISE OF THE CORPORATION AND THE 
SUPPRESSION OF THE MARKET   
The one part of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in 
Hobby Lobby that commands widespread agreement is the 
statement that commercial entities are a means to an end ra-
ther than ends in themselves.17 Nonetheless, the debate about 
the appropriate purposes of the firm is as old as the corporation 
itself, and for some ends, the nature of a firm as an entity dis-
tinct from its owners is important. 
The starting point for the discussion is straightforward. 
Corporate form is an advantage in raising capital, and the ad-
vantages stem from the separation of ownership and control.18 
Legally, the corporation offers unlimited life, limited liability 
both for the investor acquiring an equity share and the entre-
preneur undertaking the commercial enterprise, and the ability 
to transfer ownership of the shares and/or management of the 
company without liquidating the enterprise.19 The growth of the 
corporation was thus important for large, complex undertak-
ings,20 and quite different in important respects from partner-
ships or sole proprietorships.21 
The principal disadvantage of the corporation also comes 
from the separation of ownership and control.22 Indeed, corpo-
rate form took hold more readily in the United States than the 
United Kingdom perhaps because of the latter’s early, unhappy 
experiences with corporate entities.23 Adam Smith wrote in The 
 
 17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 18. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law 
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
387, 388–93 (2003) (arguing that the ability to lock in investors’ capital was 
the primary advantage over other business forms). 
 19. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the 
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 885 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993). 
 20. Blair, supra note 18, at 398–99. 
 21. Indeed, most businesses of all kinds were sole proprietorships or part-
nerships until at least the middle of the nineteenth century. David Millon, 
Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1024 (2013). 
 22. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Or-
ganizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 435 (2000); see also 2 ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 
(R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 1976). 
 23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The 
Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 
YALE L.J. 1, 24–25 (2001) (maintaining that the United States led in the dis-
persion of ownership and did so in part because of the capital needs of large 
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Wealth of Nations that the directors of such companies, “being 
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their 
own,” cannot be expected to “watch over it with the same anx-
ious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. . . . Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail.”24 At their worst, corporations 
can be “weapons” designed to exploit unwary investors or ex-
tend the reach of fraudulent schemes.25 
The basic advantage—capital accumulation—and the dis-
advantages that come from the separation of ownership and 
control do not necessarily indicate very much about corporate 
purpose or the role of an entity as a means to those ends. In-
stead, as the corporation took hold in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the major discussion concerned corporate 
size.26 The rise of the industrial era marked the emergence of 
large-scale organizations that coordinated human activity.27 
Economists, like Adam Smith, associated the creation of wealth 
with specialization and trade; corporations brought that spe-
cialization in-house. John Kenneth Galbraith observed, howev-
er, that large organizations, which established prices and in-
sured a demand for their products, were “enemies of the 
market.”28 In the view that dominated discussion of the firm 
from the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of 
the 1970s, the essential role of the corporation lay in the role of 
corporate size in creating distinctive advantages and risks. Un-
derstanding these advantages and the risks requires seeing the 
corporation as an institution that stood apart from the interests 
 
railroads); id. at 39–45 (discussing later developments in the United King-
dom). 
 24. SMITH, supra note 22.  
 25. Coffee, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that because of the risks of corrup-
tion, prominent underwriters refused until the end of the nineteenth century 
to underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations); see also Stanton 
Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in White-
Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403, 1422–26 (1982) (“[P]ersons who commit 
offenses under the aegis of an organization are able thereby to commit crimes 
of greater sophistication, complexity, and magnitude.”). 
 26. See Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust 
and the Foundations of Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to 
Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 91 (2005) (describing the interplay between 
the growth of corporate size and antitrust regulation at the beginning of the 
twentieth century). 
 27. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 40–41 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (1967). 
 28. Id. at 41. And, in Galbraith’s era, he meant “men.” 
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of its stakeholders and had importance greater than the sum of 
its parts. 
A. CORPORATE IDENTITY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PRICE 
MECHANISM 
The idea of the firm as an entity greater than the sum of 
its parts has long been accepted as a defining feature of capital-
ism. In 1991, Ronald Coase received the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics, with one of his two major contributions to the field en-
titled The Nature of the Firm.29 His role in the corporate debate 
serves as a touchstone both for understanding the industrial 
age corporation at its height and as an inspiration for the in-
formation age theorists who would dismantle it. He wrote ini-
tially as a graduate student in the 1930s in an effort to provide 
an economic explanation for the increasing size of organiza-
tions. The paper was largely ignored for the next thirty years, 
and then rose to prominence less as an explanation for the 
phenomena Coase sought to explain than as an agent of its de-
struction.30 The key to the paper’s influence may well be its 
brevity. Coase would say in his Nobel Prize acceptance lecture 
that that his work has been criticized for its failure to “opera-
tionalize” its core insights, that is, to define the variables that 
underlie transaction cost economics in a way that allows them 
to be quantified and empirically tested.31 That “failure” may 
well be the secret of his success: subsequent scholars can read 
into the work the interpretations that advance their own theo-
ries. We will do the same and argue that Coase’s critical insight 
about the role of firms fits comfortably with explanations of 
large corporations at the height of their influence and the intel-
lectual developments that mark their decline. “Operationaliz-
ing Coase” thus means identifying what role the suppression of 
the price mechanism, the factor he most identifies with the na-
ture of the firm, plays as that role changes over time. While we 
make no pretense of engaging in formal economic modeling, we 
do emphasize the importance of singling out the factors that 
 
 29. Coase, supra note 2. To be sure, Coase was influenced by other econo-
mists. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Univ. of 
Chicago Press, Midway Reprint ed. 1985) (1921). 
 30. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business 
Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 869 (2010) (describing Coase’s impact). 
 31. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL 
LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES: 1991–1995, at 11, 18–19 (Torsten Persson 
ed., World Scientific Publ’g Co. 1997). 
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explain the rise of large business entities at their height and 
their more recent decline. 
In his initial article, Coase argued that the rise of the large 
corporation should be treated as an economic mystery. Econo-
mists after all celebrated the price mechanism, that is, Adam 
Smith’s unseen hand coordinating the supply of goods and ser-
vices in accordance with market exchanges, as the hallmark of 
efficiency. Yet, Coase observed that “the distinguishing mark of 
the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.”32 Given 
that economists posited that production did not require any or-
ganization at all, why did the firm arise and, indeed, why had 
large firms become so central to economic production? 
To provide an answer, Coase framed the question in terms 
of a comparison between the advantages of the market and use 
of the price mechanism versus those of a command and control 
system where the entrepreneur owner could simply order the 
result.33 His description of the alternatives—market transac-
tions or command and control—is remarkably thin. Coase de-
scribes the character of a contract internal to the firm as one 
whereby “the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be 
fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entre-
preneur within certain limits.”34 This description almost cer-
tainly reflects two influences. The first is the contrast between 
capitalist markets and socialist economies and it contains a 
measure of irony. Coase begins the article observing that 
“[t]hose who object to economic planning on the grounds that 
the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by 
pointing out that there is planning within our economic system 
. . . which is akin to what is normally called economic plan-
ning.”35 This “economic planning” is the boss telling his employ-
ees what to do.36 
Second, the dominant management model of the era was 
“Fordism,” modeled after Henry Ford’s use of the assembly 
 
 32. Coase, supra note 2, at 389. 
 33. Id. at 390. 
 34. Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). Coase italicized the words “within cer-
tain limits” and added in a footnote that “[i]t would be possible for no limits to 
the powers of the entrepreneur to be fixed. This would be voluntary slavery.” 
Id. at 391, 391 n.2. 
 35. Id. at 387–88. 
 36. Coase explains, “If a workman moves from department Y to depart-
ment X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is 
ordered to do so.” Id. at 387. 
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line.37 As a more general term, Fordism has been defined in 
terms of the separation of conception from execution, the sub-
stitution of skilled workers with unskilled workers, and the use 
of universal machinery to produce one product for mass mar-
kets.38 As a management principle (often called “Taylorism”), 
the idea required management control over labor in the name 
of efficiency.39 While Coase does not discuss management theo-
ries per se, he viewed management’s ability to direct labor as 
definitional. He accordingly wrote that what constitutes a firm 
in practice is tied to the legal relationship between employer 
and employee (or “master and servant”) and that legal relation-
ship involves the duty of the servant to render personal ser-
vices to the master and the master’s right to control the serv-
ant’s work.40 Indeed, the employer’s ability to tell the employee 
when to work, what work to do, and how to do it becomes “the 
dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the serv-
ant from an independent contractor” as a matter of law.41 
In considering the value of the firm, Coase stresses the 
need to deal with uncertainty and (as always for Coase) trans-
action costs.42 In this model, the critical role of the firm then 
becomes its ability to serve as an alternative to the price mech-
anism. To the extent that the use of markets has a high price, 
perhaps because of the unpredictability of future events, the 
firm gives the entrepreneur greater flexibility.43 The value of 
Coase’s insight, however, does not lie with his specification of 
how a firm organizes any particular activity; instead, it is the 
 
 37. Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Putting Worker-Management Relations in 
Context: Why Employee Representational Choice Needs Greater Protection in 
Reform of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 59 (1997). 
 38. CHARLES F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS: THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN 
INDUSTRY 32–33, 194–95 (1982). 
 39. These ideas are closely associated with Frederick W. Taylor. See, e.g., 
Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management, in SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 17, 98–
99 (Frederick Winslow Taylor ed. 1947) (“All possible brain work should be 
removed from the shop and centered in the planning or laying-out depart-
ment.”). For an evaluation of Taylor’s impact, see HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR 
AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 90 (1974) (emphasizing the importance of Taylor’s principles as a 
management tool in gaining nearly absolute control over the labor process). 
 40. Coase, supra note 2, at 403–04. 
 41. Id. at 404 (citing FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 
6 (1933)). 
 42. Id. at 394–95, 400–03. 
 43. Id. at 391 (noting that the longer the contract term, the harder it be-
comes to specify what needs to be done). 
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contrast between market and non-market transactions and the 
startling conclusion, at least for an economist, that even in the 
productive realm, non-market organization may be superior.44 
Coase’s conclusion suggested that the firm as an entity might 
have some importance. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL ERA AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE FIRM 
Coase tried in the thirties to create a schema that could 
predict when a firm would find it more useful to bring activities 
in-house rather than contract for the same goods and services 
on the market. His answer—when the advantages of command 
and control outweighed the market—did not give much insight 
into the forces that produced the advantages he described.45 
Two other bodies of work go into those advantages in much 
greater detail: those describing the coordination of labor within 
firms and those describing a large enterprise’s advantages in 
addressing external conditions. The description of the former 
comes from John Kenneth Galbraith’s work on The New Indus-
trial State in the 1960s.46 
The rise of large organizations in the twentieth century 
marked the rise of what Max Weber termed “bureaucracy,” 
both within government and within business enterprises.47 Like 
Coase, he assigned considerable credit to hierarchy—to the cre-
ation of a command structure that coordinated activities.48 We-
ber, however, gave considerably more weight to the idea of ex-
pertise and to the association of authority with that expertise.49 
 
 44. Indeed, Coase addresses only the classical notion of efficiency in the 
production of goods and services. See, e.g., id. at 394, 398–99. 
 45. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountabil-
ity, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 402–03 nn.33–34 (2007) (noting that 
“[t]ransaction cost methodology requires the evaluation of relative costs” but 
that “[t]ransaction costs are not consistently defined in the literature”); Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2005). 
 46. GALBRAITH, supra note 27. 
 47. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956–63 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (1922). Weber also noted a number of the dark sides 
of bureaucracy, such as reduced transparency—which permitted those with 
expertise to maintain the power that accompanies specialized expertise. See, 
e.g., Louis M. Imbeau, Transparency in the Budget Process of a Bureaucratic 
Organisation: A Principal-Agent Model of Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS 189, 189–90 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2007) (dis-
cussing Weber’s views on the danger of expertise). 
 48. See 2 WEBER, supra note 47. 
 49. See id. 
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Galbraith’s work three decades later explained how the two 
came together as the hallmark of large corporations. In Gal-
braith’s model, the individual entrepreneur and the all-
powerful executive disappear.50 Institutions, with large compa-
nies primary among them, had become more important than 
the individuals who direct them, and the connections between 
the company and its top officers central to the coordination of 
technocratic enterprises. 
Modern media theory, when applied to organizational be-
havior, describes institutions as supplying an identity associat-
ed with a firm that in turn commands loyalty from those who 
embrace the identity.51 Economists George Akerlof and Rachel 
Kranton used this idea of identity to examine the ability of a 
firm to create employee identification with firm objectives and 
values.52 Workers who think of themselves as insiders rather 
than outsiders require less in the way of extra compensation to 
produce desired results and become less likely to game the 
compensation system that does exist.53 Moreover, group cohe-
sion increases feelings of loyalty and reduces turnover. Akerlof 
and Kranton concluded that “[w]orker identification may there-
fore be a major factor, perhaps even the dominant factor, in the 
success or failure of organizations.”54 
Galbraith’s account of the corporation at mid-twentieth-
century made the same point in explaining corporate success at 
the height of the manufacturing era. Written at a point almost 
equidistant between Coase and Akerlof and Kranton, Galbraith 
found that the principal problem for any organization is how to 
coordinate the activities of members.55 Doing so requires ad-
dressing the issue of motivation. Like Akerlof and Kranton, he 
found that neither compulsion nor pecuniary incentives were 
enough.56 Instead, the most effective motivation comes from 
 
 50. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–22. 
 51. See, e.g., DONALD HISLOP, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS 230 (2013) (describing how the most effective way to deal with problems 
such as employee turnover is to develop institutional identity and employee 
loyalty and observing that institutional identity that encourages employees to 
identify with firm objectives creates stronger loyalty than instrumental 
measures such as merit pay or bonuses). 
 52. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: 
HOW OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 176–85. 
 56. Ironically, given the later emphasis on agency costs, Galbraith ob-
  
2017] THE DEATH OF THE FIRM 977 
 
employees who identify with the goals of the firm and derive 
tremendous satisfaction from achieving them or, short of that, 
who partially identify with the firm’s objectives and hope to be 
able to influence them in a direction more to their liking.57 In 
short, Galbraith, too, believed in “identity economics” and 
found the firm as entity central to the creation of identity. 
Galbraith nevertheless distinguished among different 
groups associated with companies. He maintained that identifi-
cation with the company affected the productivity of all em-
ployees, though the effect was likely to be least pronounced 
among the less skilled. Still, the individual worker came to 
think of himself as “an IBM man, a Corning Glass man or a 
Sears man.”58 He observed further: 
Next, as one moves inward, are foremen and supervisory personnel 
and the clerical, sales and other routine white collar personnel. These 
merge at their inner perimeter with technicians, engineers, sales ex-
ecutives, scientists, designers and other specialists who comprise the 
technostructure. Beyond these at the center are the executives or 
management. As one moves through these inner circles, identification 
and adaptation become increasingly important.59 
In other words, as employees move up the corporate ladder, po-
sitions require greater expertise and judgment; as the oppor-
tunity for discretionary judgment increases, the difficulty of 
specifying outcomes grows and the importance of motivation 
increases. Identity—with the corporation and with a profes-
sional role—supplies a significant portion of that motivation. 
Within this schema, Galbraith identified shareholders as 
those most motivated by monetary incentives—and least inter-
ested in the health of the company beyond what might be a 
very limited investment.60 In contrast, corporate officers of the 
 
served that compulsion produced the highest cost to the firm in terms of over-
sight and monitoring and pecuniary incentives, such as bonuses tied to pro-
duction goals, provided little basis for loyalty and, as Akerlof and Kranton 
would later observe, incentives to game the system, requiring that much 
greater oversight in turn. See id. at 164–67. For a fuller discussion, see 
Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate 
Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1040. 
 57. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–22. 
 58. Id. at 188. Akerlof and Kranton add that employees, like enlisted per-
sonnel in the military, may identify more with their unit than with the enter-
prise more generally, but that the unit identification can also be a strong 
source of motivation. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 52, at 56–57. 
 59. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 152–53. 
 60. Id. at 150–51. For a more complex account of shareholder interests, 
however, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
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postwar era tended to see their role as one of company stewards 
who linked particular company objectives to technocratic norms 
that made the quality of their stewardship an indication of pro-
fessional standing.61 Galbraith observed that while corporate 
officers often did own stock or stock options, and while they of-
ten had access to information from which they could personally 
benefit, they rarely acted to advance their individual pecuniary 
interests at the expense of the firm—or their professional 
standing.62 Instead, “[p]ower passe[d] down into the organiza-
tion,”63 and acting on self-interest was just not what “a good 
company man” did.64 
Galbraith attributed the strength of the ethos to group de-
cision-making and identification.65 Indeed, he asserted that the 
prevalence of group, rather than individual, action “is a strik-
ing characteristic of management organization in the large cor-
poration.”66 Galbraith even defended the committee. Commit-
tees were necessary, in part, because the complexity of the 
corporation required broad input.67 With group sessions, the in-
dividual’s actions, reasoning, and behavior were subject to 
scrutiny.68 Individuals were expected to live up to a high level of 
personal honesty, and they benefitted as part of a group, rather 
than as individuals competing against each other for promo-
tions or bonuses. Pay levels, whether generous or not, did not 
 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012). 
 61. Harwell Wells notes that this idea of stewardship even had a place in 
the Harvard Business School’s conception of the Managerial Role. Harwell 
Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and 
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 305, 323–24 (2013). 
 62. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 146–48. 
 63. Id. at 147. 
 64. Id. at 147–48. 
 65. Galbraith wrote: 
Thus decision in the modern business enterprise is the product not of 
individuals but of groups. The groups are numerous, as often informal 
as formal, and subject to constant change in composition. Each con-
tains the men possessed of the information, or with access to the in-
formation, that bears on the particular decision together with those 
whose skill consists in extracting and testing this information and ob-
taining a conclusion. 
Id. at 80. 
 66. Id. at 73 (citation omitted). 
 67. See id. (citing JUSTIN G. LONGNECKER, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 263 (Charles E. Merrill, 3d ed. 1973)). 
 68. Id. at 78. 
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vary with firm profits69 and the CEO’s income, which was not 
that much higher than that of other senior management offi-
cials, paled in comparison with the compensation levels of the 
twenties or today.70 Galbraith concluded that business enter-
prise in “modern economic society” could “only be understood as 
an effort, wholly successful, to synthesize by organization a 
group personality far superior for its purposes to a natural per-
son”—and it had the advantage of immortality to boot.71 
To be sure, the advantages of this system did not come 
solely from the strength of individual corporate identities. In-
stead, it came from the combination of firm stewardship with 
something Galbraith called the “technostructure.” This 
technostructure included “all who bring specialized knowledge, 
talent or experience to group decision-making.”72 This group, 
with its shared ethos and commitment to technocratic man-
agement, rather than top corporate officials per se, constituted 
“the guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise.”73 While 
these corporate groups did bring different perspectives and 
types of expertise to bear on individual decisions, they also cre-
ated reinforcing cycles that deepened identification with the 
firm. Charles O’Kelley explained: “Thus, decisions are made in 
order to enhance the ability of technocrats to identify with the 
firm, to reward team members who are able to further the goals 
of the technocracy, and, if possible, to subtly and incrementally 
adapt the corporation to the CEO’s own values.”74 
This notion of scientific management had its limitations. 
The group did not necessarily seek to maximize short-term cor-
porate profits.75 Instead, with closer management identification 
with the firm itself, the first order of the day was the survival 
of the corporation.76 Safe and dependable earnings expansion 
served that end better than risks, which, however much they 
promised exceptional returns, could also produce catastrophic 
losses. In addition, this group, confident in its own judgment, 
 
 69. Id. at 147. 
 70. See id. at 138–39 (discussing how lower executive pay tracks to a 
commitment to the success of the corporation over self-interest); O’Kelley, su-
pra note 56, at 1022, 1046 (discussing the relatively high pay of CEOs in the 
twenties and today compared to that of their employees). 
 71. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 74. 
 72. Id. at 88. 
 73. Id. 
 74. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1042. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1041. 
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sought to insure its own autonomy.77 CEOs did not have dicta-
torial power in an era of management by committee,78 but they 
did enjoy considerable independence from shareholders, who 
remained more broadly dispersed than today’s institutional in-
vestors, and from other outside actors.79 
In this system, the firm did become more important than 
the individual. Few would confuse the world dominated by be-
hemoths like General Motors, International Business Machines 
Corporation (IBM), or Ma Bell with entrepreneur-run enter-
prises such as Ford or Standard Oil of a half century earlier, or 
the Steve Jobs–run Apple or Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook of 
more recent times. And with longer worker tenure in both the 
senior management and production ranks, corporate officers 
identified their own success and well-being far more with the 
health and prestige of their companies than with their individ-
ual bank accounts. It therefore made sense to bring activities 
inside the firm to the extent that this technocratic motivation, 
which came from the combination of firm and professional iden-
tity, provided greater advantages than from more contingent 
arrangements. And with greater firm investment in workers 
and a correspondingly greater commitment to worker tenure, 
employment became a foundation for individual security and 
employee well-being.80 One way of “operationalizing” Coase 
therefore becomes the calculus: When does identification with 
firm objectives and ethos offer advantages that outweigh the 
costs of commitment to a long-term workforce?81 
As firms grew, however, and their size in itself contributed 
to the impact of these behemoth firms, primary among the ef-
 
 77. See id.  
 78. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 70. These limits on the CEO came 
from the CEO’s need to defer to those with superior technical expertise. Id. at 
72. 
 79. See O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1002–03. 
 80. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53 
TULANE L. REV. 697, 701–02 (1979) (“[A]n inference is justified that arbitra-
tors have both sensed and contributed to the heightened importance of the job 
relationship as a focal point of security and standing in society . . . .”). 
 81. The answer, of course, depends in part on whether the labor market is 
tight or slack, and partly on whether the benefits of firm identity and corre-
sponding worker loyalty justify a commitment to long-term stability in em-
ployment. For a discussion of the propriety of loyalty in the absence of employ-
er commitment to employees, see David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson, 
Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
297 (2007). 
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fects was greater insulation from market pressures. This pro-
duced a different body of analysis, emphasizing the risks as 
well as the advantages to the public of large organizations. 
C. THE RISKS OF LARGE ORGANIZATIONS 
Coase, in identifying the advantages of firms, mentioned 
several kinds of effects. The first was the ability to command 
employees, but the second involved the ability to plan free from 
immediate market pressures.82 Galbraith also mentioned the 
advantages large firms have to set prices (often with the tacit 
agreement of other firms) and to create demand (often through 
product design, packaging, and advertising).83 For much of the 
twentieth century, debate about corporations involved debate 
about their insulation from market forces, not to achieve com-
petitive advantages in planning for uncertain future events, 
but in order to acquire greater control over the events them-
selves.84 Another way to operationalize Coase suggests that 
firms continue to grow in size so long as the contribution of 
greater size to their ability to control events does not outweigh 
the costs. Stated in these terms, size becomes connected to po-
litical and market power rather than production efficiencies.85 
With increased growth, corporations became more power-
ful. The largest corporations of the industrial era tended either 
to be part of cartels such as big steel, big auto, and big oil, or 
heavily regulated utilities, such as General Electric (GE) and 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). The 
sheer size of the institutions increased their political clout and 
 
 82. See Coase, supra note 2, at 390–92. 
 83. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 251–54, 319. 
 84. Harwell Wells summarized these observations: 
[Corporations] were unique not just because of their size, but because 
they were competing in oligopolistic or highly regulated markets and 
were insulated from intensive competitive pressures. Capable of gen-
erating capital internally, they also were independent of capital mar-
kets. Buffered from external controls, the largest firms resembled in-
dependent states: they could command an army of employees, 
determine what to produce, set prices, direct scientific progress, de-
cide which communities received new investment, and even set the 
rate of capital expansion. 
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Histori-
cal Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 102 
(2002). 
 85. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connec-
tion, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317, 1339–40 (2011) (quoting THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: 
THE CASE OF AMERICA 220 (A.M. Kelley 1964) (1923)). 
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their impact on the communities in which they were located. 
General Motors layoffs could devastate Detroit, and wiping out 
a class of shareholders—often employees without diversified 
portfolios—could create ripple effects throughout affected com-
munities.86 The initial responses at the turn of the twentieth 
century addressed the power size conferred.87 The growing in-
fluence of monopolies and cartels spurred antitrust measures 
with the aim of recreating competitive markets, and justified 
the creation of a more powerful State capable of countering the 
growth of private power.88 In the 1930s, concern about corpo-
rate power took a different direction, focusing on the changing 
nature of the firm itself. This commentary critiqued the separa-
tion of ownership and control as the hallmark of large corpora-
tions, and the increasing impact of large corporations not just 
on business arrangements, but on important aspects of the 
lives of the communities they affected.89 Adolph Berle and Gar-
diner Means’s magisterial volume, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, published in 1932, called corporate man-
agers of this era “princes of industry” and likened their power 
to the overseer of a principality.90 
Berle and Means argued that, by the Great Depression, the 
corporation as entity had taken on a significance that made it 
something more than the tools of its owners. They maintained 
that the corporations of the era oversaw economic empires that 
aggregated capital from widely dispersed sources and used it to 
create complex, unaccountable enterprises.91 Taking together 
 
 86. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 306 (1932) (noting that the “great associations” 
of the industrial age “are so different from the small, privately owned enter-
prises of the past as to make the concept of private enterprise an ineffective 
instrument of analysis”). 
 87. See Wells, supra note 61, at 316–17 (emphasizing the role of oligopo-
listic concentration in increasing firm power). 
 88. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 374 (1909) (ad-
vocating for the need to break up monopolies through legal and political 
means due to their threat to “any thoroughly democratic and constructive sys-
tem of municipal economy”). 
 89. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 5 (noting, however, that many cor-
porations were not necessarily geographically bound). 
 90. Id. at 4. 
 91. Id. at 4–5. Berle observed that corporate managers obtained greater 
independence not just from shareholders, but also from creditors. By restrict-
ing stock dividends, the managers could generate additional cash internally 
for new investments, limiting their dependence on creditors as well. See 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35–41 
(1954). 
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the corporation’s impact on its shareholders, employees, and 
the communities it affected, Berle and Means concluded that 
corporations had become “quasi-public” entities akin to princi-
palities that affected, in one way or another, every household in 
America.92 
In discussing the separation of ownership and control, 
Berle and Means raised two different types of issues. The first 
involved the ability of a control bloc of shareholders to fleece 
other shareholders.93 In the decade that preceded Berle and 
Means’s book, stock ownership had increased dramatically, 
with the stock market boom of the twenties fueled in part by 
the increased participation of small investors. These investors 
often had limited voting rights and less control over corporate 
policies.94 Moreover, during the same period, corporate execu-
tives often commanded outsized salaries with minimal disclo-
sure or accountability.95 Indeed, one commentator of the period 
observed that “the fat boys, no longer content with their an-
cient perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the 
dizzy and lofty job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”96 
Concern that managers, who were often controlling sharehold-
ers, served to advance their own ends at the expense of other 
shareholders was widely shared, and thought to be one of the 
principal causes of the Great Depression.97 
The second concern had to do with the impact of large cor-
porations on communities. Large industrial firms depended on 
established supply chains and a large supply of workers.98 This 
 
 92. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 4. 
 93. See id. at 128–218 (arguing that, because the law had gradually re-
duced the rights of shareholders, it was questionable whether they could be 
termed owners at all). 
 94. Indeed, Berle and Means devoted nearly a hundred pages to detailing 
the legal changes that gave shareholders less corporate power. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: 
The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 
689, 707–08 (2010). 
 96. Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 264. 
 97. Berle and Means commented further that: 
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a gi-
ant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a 
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of 
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The or-
ganizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm of 
private enterprise—they have become more nearly social institutions.  
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 46. 
 98. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) 
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in turn made such companies vulnerable to labor or supply 
chain disruptions.99 A major source of the uncertainty Coase 
described involved insuring that supplies and workers would be 
available when needed. A solution was the creation of ever-
larger, vertically integrated entities.100 Berle explained that by 
the time of the early thirties, 200 corporations had amassed 
wealth equal to almost half the industrial assets of the country, 
and the profits generated by these companies had an effect 
through their shareholders on perhaps half of the country.101 
The larger the entities, however, the greater their power and 
potential impact on the communities in which they were locat-
ed, and hence the greater the potential disruptive effects from 
the wrong-doing Berle and Means described.102 Moreover, the 
change from entrepreneurial firms to firms characterized by 
the separation of ownership and control also meant that com-
munity norms had less impact on owners and managers.103 An 
entrepreneurial owner, for example, might find that if he 
fleeced his customers, mistreated his employees, or sold shoddy 
products, his personal standing in the community would 
drop.104 Management committees or a control bloc of sharehold-
 
(summarizing literature that describes vertical integration as a response to 
firm dependence on supply chains and observing that modern innovative firms 
no longer follow the same patterns). 
 99. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal routinely writes articles today ex-
plaining the difficulty manufacturing companies have in locating such plants 
in the United States because of the difficulties of reestablishing supply chains 
and skilled labor forces. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, For U.S. Manufacturing, 
Opportunities and Challenges, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/for-u-s-manufacturing-opportunities-and-challenges-1433300938 (em-
phasizing trained workers, infrastructure, and supply chains); Ted Mann, Otis 
Finds ‘Reshoring’ Manufacturing Is Not Easy, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023045187045795194329465744
24; see also Mark Muro, Reshoring: Strong Regions Will Determine Where, 
How, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 
the-avenue/2014/10/02/reshoring-strong-regions-will-determine-where-how. 
 100. See Gilson et al., supra note 98, at 438–39 (describing industries for 
which vertical integration was initially seen as a superior model). 
 101. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: 
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368 n.8 (1932). 
 102. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1247, 1290 (2010) (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 352). 
 103. See Berle, supra note 101, at 1367–68 (suggesting that, in systems 
that emphasize individual ownership, managers are subject neither to market 
discipline nor community norms). 
 104. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trus-
tees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932) (arguing that a changing public atti-
tude about a business’s obligations to the community will lead to changed be-
havior in managers). 
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ers, on the other hand, were often relatively anonymous and 
their membership could change over time, making them that 
much less accountable to anyone. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, breaking up 
these concentrations of power was the preferred solution. Berle 
and Means instead sought to tame them. In their view, this in-
creasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a relatively 
few, unaccountable entities rendered “the corporation an organ-
ization with an impact comparable to the medieval church or 
the modern state.”105 They concluded that the power of the 
modern corporation and the unaccountability of its managers 
“placed the community in a position to demand that the modern 
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all so-
ciety.”106 
D. THE TAMING OF CORPORATE POWER 
Berle and Means, who emphasized the problems stemming 
from the separation of ownership and control, have defined the 
corporate governance debate ever since. Ironically, they remain 
iconic figures in the area where their work hit an inescapable 
dead end: the private law that governs the relationships among 
corporate stakeholders. They have been less influential in the 
arena they most sought to influence at the time: the role of 
State and community in offsetting the accumulation of corpo-
rate power.107 To operationalize Berle the corporate scholar and 
Berle and Means collectively requires asking the question: As 
the nature of corporate power shifts, what measures become 
necessary to protect the interests of other stakeholders, that is, 
how can parity be restored among business, labor, and commu-
nity interests? 
To answer the question requires separating the two issues 
Berle and Means identified: the use of corporate structure to 
enrich a control bloc at the expense of customers, workers, and 
other shareholders; and the use of corporate structure to ad-
vance the interests of corporate actors at the expense of the 
larger community. The classic debate between Berle and law 
professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the pages of the Harvard Law 
Review explains the dilemma for systems of private govern-
 
 105. Wells, supra note 102, at 1290. 
 106. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 312. 
 107. Cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond 
Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 20 (1988). 
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ance. Berle, concerned about unaccountable control blocs vic-
timizing other shareholders, argued for stronger fiduciary du-
ties by corporate officers and directors to maximize shareholder 
wealth.108 In 1932, Dodd, more concerned about corporate com-
munity obligations, challenged the idea that stockholders 
should be the “sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise,” 
preferring broader duties to multiple stakeholders.109 Berle ob-
jected that the problem was that the “relatively unbridled scope 
of corporate management has, to date, brought forward in the 
main seizure of power without recognition of responsibility—
ambition without courage.”110 To allow corporate managers to 
focus solely on corporate earnings might shortchange communi-
ty interests, but to allow corporate managers to advance a 
broader array of interests meant, as a practical matter, that 
they would be subject to no legally enforceable standards at 
all.111 In short, corporate law, limited to private enforcement of 
private obligations, offered no real answer to the full set of 
challenges corporate power posed.112 
Ultimately, what changed the exercise of corporate power 
was less a shift in corporate governance or a change in fiduci-
ary duties, than factors extrinsic to the corporation itself. These 
changes ultimately tamed the unaccountable exercise of corpo-
rate power as the corporations themselves retained and even 
expanded their dominant position in economic life. Thus, Berle 
and Means wrote that the increasing power of corporations 
gave rise to increasing public sentiment that those exercising 
corporate power “accept responsibility for the well-being of 
those subject to the organization, whether workers, investors, 
or consumers.”113 The obligation to others came from the fact of 
corporate power, and corporate power came from corporate in-
 
 108. See Berle, supra note 101, at 1367–68. 
 109. Dodd, supra note 104, at 1147–48. 
 110. Berle, supra note 101, at 1370. 
 111. Id. at 1367–68. 
 112. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (arguing that 
shareholder wealth maximization may be the best rule of corporate govern-
ance because “a stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave 
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own 
agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, 
nor national wealth, but only their own”); cf. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 792–
93 (arguing that the Hobby Lobby owners are free to pursue their own defini-
tions of corporate interest because they should not be limited to narrow re-
quirements to maximize corporate or shareholder wealth). 
 113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 310. 
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sulation from competitive forces and outside control. This insu-
lation would, at the height of the managerial era, give corpo-
rate managers the latitude to advance a broader set of inter-
ests.114 The more interesting question is why they did so. 
The conventional wisdom has three overlapping compo-
nents. First, mid-nineteenth century scholars, Galbraith nota-
bly among them, argued that that “countervailing powers,” 
principally unions and the State, limited corporate freedom of 
action.115 Galbraith thus argued that the very power of corpora-
tions encouraged the organization of opposition.116 
Take unions, for example. In accordance with Galbraith’s 
analysis, corporate power both encouraged and made possible 
union power. The very dominance of large employers encour-
aged organizing efforts to target them. The insulation of these 
employers from competitive markets allowed their managers to 
engineer union settlements and, as Dodd had argued in the 
thirties, increased public pressure on them to do so. Moreover, 
postwar corporations, insulated from greater competition, also 
decided that a labor truce—and higher worker compensation—
created greater demand for corporate products.117 Given the size 
of the unionized plants, the labor rights won in these actions 
influenced wages and benefits more generally as the unionized 
plants played an outsized role in the labor market.118 Union vic-
tories in turn reduced employee turnover119 and union organiza-
 
 114. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–08, 221–22 (noting that the 
“mature corporation . . . identifies itself with goals which have, or appear to 
. . . have, social purpose”); Wells, supra note 61 (discussing the evolution of 
corporate social power). 
 115. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CON-
CEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–200 (1952). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Wells observed that: 
By the end of that decade, though, the endemic struggle between cap-
ital and labor was replaced, at least in the public eye, by a labor-
management concordat in which corporate managers were left to run 
their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions received 
income and benefits sufficient to carry their members into the middle 
class. 
Wells, supra note 61, at 322. 
 118. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capital-
ism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1105 (2011) (maintaining that these reinforcing ef-
fects work well in a slack economy, but have destabilizing inflationary tenden-
cies over time). 
 119. Union victories both made it harder to fire employees and made jobs 
more attractive as they provided benefits, raises, and other advantages that 
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tion, as it created more cohesive worker groups, also had the 
effect of reinforcing employee identification with the compa-
ny.120 Union and management interests, both tied to large or-
ganizations, became somewhat less antagonistic. 
Second, the State, which increased in power along with 
corporations, used regulation of institutions to advance state 
interests. In the process, the institution itself became im-
portant to the vindication of public purposes. Galbraith certain-
ly recognized, for example, that large corporations did not nec-
essarily welcome union organizers121 and federal labor relations 
laws promoting union organization and collective bargaining 
may have been “the most critical, controversial, and divisive 
manifestation of governmental intervention to promote coun-
tervailing power.”122 Other federal laws, perhaps most notably 
the Civil Rights Era employment discrimination statutes, used 
the regulation of hiring practices in large, private organizations 
to model country-wide expectations about appropriate behavior. 
Individuals could choose to discriminate; organizations, partic-
ularly large organizations, could not. 
The State and large private organizations began to provide 
societal benefits in parallel ways. The New Deal initiation of 
social security benefits marked a major expansion of the role of 
the State in providing a social safety net.123 Still, the expansion 
of private pensions, particularly those supplied by large corpo-
rations, established a broad-based complementary system as an 
incentive to stay with a single employer.124 Larger corporations 
provided more pension security, and pension benefits further 
cemented the importance of firms as institutions with longer-
 
increased with seniority. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and In-
dustrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1963). 
 120. See Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, 
Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 952 (1992). 
 121. See Cioffi, supra note 118, at 1102–03 (noting the contradictions in 
Galbraith’s analysis as he simultaneously suggests that countervailing powers 
arise spontaneously and that their effectiveness may depend on government 
intervention). 
 122. Id. at 1103–04. 
 123. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement In-
come and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1124 (1997) (“[O]ut of 6.5 million people over age sixty-
five in the United States [in the thirties], only 150,000 aged people were re-
ceiving ‘industrial and trade-union pensions,’ with possibly an equal number 
receiving veterans’ or public retirement system pensions.”). 
 124. See id. at 1117. 
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term time horizons and a larger significance to the lives of their 
employees. 
This role of large institutions in remaking communities 
perhaps reached its height with health care. The United States, 
unlike most of the developed world, did not build a public sys-
tem of universal health insurance in part because of its reliance 
on the private employment system to do so. Many scholars view 
the reliance on private plans as an accident of timing—the pub-
lic pressure to establish universal insurance came as employers 
embraced private benefits as a way around the price controls 
established during World War II.125 The ubiquity of larger em-
ployers made it possible to envision widespread health coverage 
with only limited public provision for the elderly and the poor. 
Large corporations within this system collectively performed 
societal roles that did not depend on the individual missions of 
particular firms. 
Third, corporate managers, at least during the period that 
ran from the forties through the seventies, did take a broader 
view of corporate interests.126 Here, however, the law’s most 
important contribution may have been to stay out of the way.127 
A New Jersey decision in the fifties concluded that corporate 
managers were free to make charitable contributions where 
they could show the “gift tends reasonably to promote the good-
will of the business of the contributing corporation.”128 Other 
decisions gave greater weight to shareholder interests. Most 
decisions, however, acknowledged the directors’ fiduciary obli-
gations to the corporation and its shareholders, and as a practi-
cal matter gave corporate managers a wide berth. Dodd’s view 
in the debate with Berle appeared to have prevailed.129 
 
 125. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan Monheit, Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14839, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1373348 (“The link between employment and pri-
vate health insurance was strengthened during World War II when in 1943 
the War Labor Board ruled that controls over wages and prices imposed by the 
1942 Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insur-
ance.”). 
 126. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191–94. 
 127. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 61, at 311–12 (concluding that the different 
eras of corporate theory had little impact on corporate legal developments). 
 128. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953) (citation 
omitted). 
 129. But then Berle changed his position over the course of his lifetime as 
well. For a summary of these developments, see Wells, supra note 61. In con-
trast, corporate scholars at the turn of the twenty-first century were hailing 
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E. THE PINNACLE OF FIRM PROMINENCE 
The idea of the firm that reigned from the beginning of the 
twentieth century through the 1970s was neither constant nor 
reified into a fixed legal construct. Instead, it encompassed two 
notions that ran through these decades. Both involve the ideas 
of institutions as greater than individuals and more than the 
sum of their parts. These ideas add content to Coase’s notion of 
the firm as a device that suppresses the price mechanism and 
does so as a way to coordinate human behavior. 
The first idea is the role of identity and loyalty in coordi-
nating behavior within the firm. With the rise of great corpora-
tions, the individual entrepreneurs, the Henry Fords or the 
John D. Rockefellers, faded in importance.130 In their place, less 
recognizable, and perhaps more fungible, corporate managers 
embraced the corporate brand and saw their role as one of 
stewardship of the institution.131 This stewardship made the 
company’s well-being a hallmark of professional success, and 
encouraged alignment of individual and corporate values. The 
individual gained personal status through identification with 
the firm and saw the firm’s well-being as intimately linked 
with personal advancement.132 As modern researchers show, 
this conception of the firm provides a better motivator for em-
ployee efforts than monetary rewards, and makes it easier to 
coordinate management efforts than more competitive man-
agement systems.133 This strong conception of firm identity, 
however, also tends to be an obstacle to more radical restruc-
turing of firm mission or structure. 
This alignment between firm identity and employee moti-
vation, of course, can exist within any enterprise. The extent to 
which it characterizes the employment relationship depends on 
bonds of reciprocity. Firm commitment to employees—through 
training, opportunities for promotion, secure tenure, and bene-
 
the triumph of shareholder supremacy. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 
(2001). 
 130. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–19. 
 131. See id. at 122. 
 132. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS 
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 169 (2011) (describing how firms influence team unity 
and bonding by encouraging loyalty to the firm). 
 133. See, e.g., Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling Tina’s Ghost from the Post-
Enron Corporate Governance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 105 (2002). 
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fits—encourages greater identification and loyalty.134 On the 
other hand, temporary, routine, or changing activities may be 
better supplied through the arm’s length market transactions. 
The balance between internal and external activities is a 
changing one.135 
The second role of the large firm came with the coordina-
tion of external and internal obligations. This, too, involved 
bonds of reciprocity. Large firms benefitted most from the sup-
pression of the price mechanism not with respect to their inter-
nal operations, but from the ability to limit competition from 
rivals.136 Thus, Berle and Means and a host of reformers in the 
early part of the century emphasized the unaccountability that 
came from oligopolistic industries and the dispersion of share-
holders that left managers free to increase their salaries, risk 
other people’s money, and fleece the firm’s various constitu-
ents.137 These very same traits—relative freedom from competi-
tive pressures and from narrow wealth maximization objec-
tives—contributed to the managerial era that reached its 
height in the postwar era.138 In this period, managerial utility, 
in the form of personal professional standing and satisfaction, 
came from the identification of firm well-being with technocrat-
ic management. Managers—from CEOs to foremen—derived a 
greater part of their personal standing from identification with 
the firm and they identified the firm’s well-being less with the 
short-term bottom line and more with professional standards 
and societal objectives.139 
In this context, the relationship between external con-
straints, such as unions and insulation, and external pressures, 
such as market competition, operated in tandem. Managerial 
inclination to recognize multiple constituencies was possible in 
large part because of insulation from external threats. None-
 
 134. See, e.g., Mats Alvesson, Social Identity and the Problem of Loyalty in 
Knowledge-Intensive Companies, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 1101, 1111–15 (2000). 
 135. For discussion of the changing nature of these calculations, see 
BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 63 (discussing the continuing role 
of non-monetary incentives in motivating employees); id. at 224–29 (describing 
the casualization of work). 
 136. Indeed, unionization and full employment policies in the postwar era 
ultimately gave workers more bargaining power within firms even as the firms 
of the postwar era gained greater insulation from competition from other com-
panies. See GALBRAITH, supra note 115, at 121–23. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13. 
 138. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 145–47, 274–81. 
 139. See id. at 159–61. 
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theless, the managerial inclination to promote broader inter-
ests may also have come from greater elite unity in the postwar 
era (management and State were inclined to see their interests 
as aligned to a greater degree than today), and from the subor-
dination of individual perspectives and incentives to a group 
dynamic. This group dynamic selected for team managers, ra-
ther than individualists, and produced a shared decision-
making process that moderated extreme views.140 Both encour-
aged commitment to distinctive firm identities and alignment 
of these identities with broader societal interests. Unlike the 
managers of the twenties or the nineties, these captains of in-
dustry did not amass extraordinary fortunes, though they did 
quite well.141 Perhaps more importantly, the corporate leaders 
of this era, unlike those of the twenties or the nineties, identi-
fied to a greater degree with their communities and their em-
ployees.142 
In both of these ways, the idea of the firm as greater than 
the individuals who comprised it contributed to the coordina-
tion of relationships within the firm, and the relationships be-
tween firm, state, and community interests. The law in turn re-
sponded by building high marginal tax rates, securities 
disclosure and other regulations, and health care, civil rights, 
and other worker protections into the new foundation. The firm 
as an entity that provided security and stability and advanced 
interests greater than the sum of its parts became central to 
the life of the nation. 
II.  THE DEATH OF THE FIRM   
If the first seven decades of the twentieth century marked 
the rise of the firm as an institution greater than the sum of its 
parts, the last part of the twentieth century has marked its 
dismantling. Corporate behemoths exemplified American pros-
perity in the immediate postwar era; they were less nimble in 
facing global competition at the end of the century. The intel-
 
 140. See id. at 96. 
 141. See Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The 
Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1, 16–19 
(1992). 
 142. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corpora-
tion, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 314 (1957); see also Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel 
Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1065, 1094 (2010) (arguing that the corporate leaders of the era showed 
greater concern for the communities where they were headquartered). 
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lectual cohesiveness of American elites in the immediate post-
war era that contributed to the greater alignment of manage-
ment and labor, public and private interests gave way to re-
newed ideological division. Central to these changes was the 
reconceptualization of the firm, from an entity greater than the 
sum of its parts to the tool, if not play-toy, of a revitalized group 
of entrepreneurs.143 In the process are two central ironies. The 
attack on the firm was aimed not on large corporations’ multi-
ple weaknesses in entering a new, more competitive era, but on 
what had been their strengths. And the attack did not reject 
the seminal insights of Coase or Berle and Means. Instead, it 
embraced and reinterpreted them. 
A. THE NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS AND AGENCY-COST THEORY 
While we now think of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm as 
one of his two most important contributions to economic 
thought, leading ultimately to a Nobel Prize in 1991,144 econo-
mists paid relatively little attention to the piece at the time of 
its publication.145 Instead, Coase’s article became far more in-
fluential only after its embrace—and reinterpretation—by nex-
us-of-contract scholars decades later.146 Coase had clearly dis-
tinguished between a firm’s external affairs, characterized by 
markets, and its internal affairs, with their supersession of the 
price mechanism.147 The later scholars who would create the 
law and economics literature that has dominated corporate 
theory over the last forty years recharacterized Coase’s insight. 
They argued the firm could be best understood as “a nexus of 
contracts” and that both external and internal affairs involved 
market-driven contracts; they were just different kinds of con-
tracts produced by different types of market forces.148 
Two economists, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, pro-
vided the initial reconstruction.149 They referred back to neo-
 
 143. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500 
(2005) (describing nexus-of-contracts theory by stating that “[m]anagers and 
shareholders get to play; no one else does”). 
 144. Coase, supra note 31.  
 145. Ulen, supra note 19, at 301–02. 
 146. Ulen characterized it as a “reworking.” Id. at 310. In so doing, Ulen 
was referring, in particular, to Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972). 
 147. Ulen, supra note 19, at 310. 
 148. Id. at 319. 
 149. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 794. 
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classical theories of the firm.150 These theories had focused pri-
marily on returns to scale that compared, for example, the in-
dividual dressmaker to the clothing factory.151 Both the in-
volvement of multiple employees performing specialized tasks 
and the investment in expensive machinery produce returns to 
scale, which in turn make the processes of securing adequate 
supplies and selling the finished products more complex,152 jus-
tifying the growth of the organization coordinating the activi-
ties.153 
Coase’s insight had been that these firms managed the co-
ordination involved in these more complex organizations 
through something other than price; Alchian and Demsetz ob-
jected that the problems of coordination involved something 
more than simply the substitution of employer direction for 
contract terms. Instead, they observed that what the firm did 
was to assemble teams of workers who needed to work together 
to produce the desired output and production teams inevitably 
produced shirking—some team members would invariably 
work harder than others in a system in which it was impossible 
to determine whose input contributed what to net value.154 
Alchian and Demsetz argued that firms solved the problem 
through the entrepreneur’s role as a “residual claimant.”155 The 
entrepreneur serves as a monitor who supervises the team to 
insure that no one shirks. The entrepreneur pays the team 
members a fixed price, which restricts the employees’ jockeying 
 
 150. Id. at 781–85. 
 151. See id. at 784. 
 152. See Ulen, supra note 19, at 305. 
 153. See id. at 302. 
 154. Id. at 310. Robert Flannigan described shirking as follows: 
Generally, shirking means reduced effort expenditure. In many in-
stances, shirking is not legally actionable at all. For many tasks, 
there is a band of effort between maximal and minimal effort that 
remains contractually undefined and therefore subject to unilateral 
variation by the agent. That is, workers have a degree of latitude in 
the performance of their work. This band or range of discretionary ef-
fort typically exists because of information and monitoring weakness-
es that prevent more precise specification and enforcement of effort 
levels. . . . Principals normally prefer that their agents operate at or 
near the maximal level. Agents may prefer to operate near the mini-
mal level. Within any given band of effort, the equilibrium effort level 
will be determined by the commitment or enthusiasm of the agent as 
influenced by the incentives offered by the principal. 
Flannigan, supra note 45, at 397. 
 155. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 782–83. 
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for positions against each other,156 and keeps the residual profit 
left from team efforts, which creates an incentive to guard 
against shirking.157 In effect, Alchian and Demsetz’s analysis 
reintroduced price mechanisms within the firm. They charac-
terized the firm’s internal contracts as ones in which the entre-
preneur had an incentive to monitor in return for the ability to 
maximize residual value, and the employees agreed to work for 
a fixed price subject to such monitoring.158 
This analysis reconciled Coase’s transaction cost insights 
(specifying individual contracts for team units engaging in on-
going production may be costly and inefficient) with the nexus-
of-contract theories central to modern corporate theory. It nar-
rowed Coase’s concern with uncertainty from a broad range of 
issues that include changing consumer tastes, available sup-
plies, and labor conditions to a relatively narrow focus on shirk-
ing. It also validated the entrepreneur/owner’s dominant posi-
tion in the firm. Most fundamentally, however, it eliminated 
the developments of the preceding forty years. The idea of firm 
identity providing motivation for employee efforts disappeared 
from consideration. So, too, did the notion that relationships 
within a firm depend on something different from relationships 
outside it. Alchian and Demsetz took Coase’s idea of suppres-
sion of the price mechanism, which opened the door to consid-
eration of alternative forms of human motivation, and used it 
to validate narrow self-interest. The result presented a funda-
mental challenge to the importance of the firm itself. 
B. THE ASSAULT ON THE FIRM 
Alchian and Demsetz, in emphasizing the risk of shirking, 
focused attention on an issue that Coase had not made central 
 
 156. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explain that if all employees are simp-
ly paid a flat rate, the incentive to shirk increases. If, instead, each employee 
is paid after the fact in accordance with his or her contributions, the problem 
of rent seeking will increase; that is, of employees seeking to maximize their 
share through behavior that may undermine others and impose additional 
costs. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 266 (1999). 
 157. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 781. 
 158. Like Coase, Alchian and Demsetz drew no distinction between an ini-
tial entrepreneur like Henry Ford and later corporate managers who come and 
go without long-term identification with the firm. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, 
Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on 
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1262–64 (2012). 
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to his analysis: the separation of ownership and control. 
Alchian and Demsetz, after all, posited that the solution to the 
problem of corporate organization lay with owners’ ability to 
monitor and the incentive that their retention of the corporate 
residual gave them to do so.159 This incentive disappears, how-
ever, if those receiving the corporate residual (the own-
er/shareholders) are not those responsible for the monitoring 
(the executives). Law and economics scholars came to call this 
problem “agency costs.”160 
Coase had not addressed the issue. He described an “en-
trepreneur” who controlled the company and could be expected 
to oversee employees.161 Instead, Berle, and Berle and Means 
together, had galvanized discussion of these issues. Berle, a 
corporate lawyer, had seen the shenanigans (and often outright 
fraud) of the twenties, when companies diluted the value of 
common stock, effectively fleecing shareholders, or took “heads 
I win, tails you lose” risks with publicly traded companies that 
left shareholders holding the bag for ill-advised ventures. Ra-
ther than see corporate owners as the solution, he distrusted 
them.162 The agency-cost theorists needed to rewrite Berle as 
fundamentally as they had reinterpreted Coase—and they did. 
When the corporate governance debate resumed in the sev-
enties, the corporation no longer symbolized the concentration 
 
 159. While many people assume that shareowners “own” corporations, 
firms employ a variety of ownership structures that suggest various possible 
meanings (and multiple groups) associated with the idea of ownership. See 
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002). 
 160. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
 161. See O’Kelley, supra note 158, at 1248, 1250 (stating that Coase assert-
ed that the firm depended on the entrepreneur, its “distinct central actor”). 
Coase’s failure to mention Berle is itself interesting. Some scholars have sug-
gested that it reflects the balkanization of academic disciplines in that era. 
Berle was a law professor, Coase an economist. Berle’s co-author, Means, was, 
however, an economist, though they wrote more for legal and policy audiences 
than a more technical academic one. See Wells, supra note 61, at 307. Of 
course, Coase was a graduate student in economics in London at the time he 
conceived of the paper, and he may simply not have been aware of Berle and 
Means’s work. Another possibility, however, is that he thought of the nature of 
his inquiry as fundamentally different. Coase, after all, sought to explain the 
advantages of large corporations in coordinating production. Berle and Means 
addressed the threat large corporations posed to interests that had relatively 
little to do with production. 
 162. Though as we noted above, Berle and Dodd’s views both changed over 
time. See discussion supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
  
2017] THE DEATH OF THE FIRM 997 
 
of unaccountable power in the hands of a few. Instead, the new 
concern was complacency. Charles O’Kelley writes that the re-
ality of the mature corporation “was not risk-taking and 
swashbuckling leadership by individualistic CEOs. Rather, 
planning and collective decision making by experts was the key 
to survival and success.”163 The new theorists of the firm argued 
that managers had become too fat and happy. Instead of using 
corporate assets to their own ends by engaging in risky or un-
wise ventures, they failed to take risks that might benefit 
shareholders, particularly if such risks threatened their own 
(or in some cases their employees’) comfortable sinecures.164 The 
problem was not that they failed to look out for the corporate 
entities’ interests—in the sense of longer-term interests associ-
ated with the firm; it was that they were too eager to do so—at 
the expense of the shareholders’ prospects for short-term re-
turns.165 
Empirical findings by scholars sympathetic to the new the-
ories provided support for their conclusions. They found, for ex-
ample, that CEOs tended to resist takeover bids, even when the 
acquirers offered a substantial premium.166 The CEOs further 
favored corporate acquisitions that did not necessarily increase 
corporate valuation.167 These studies also showed that when 
CEOs enjoyed a substantial ownership stake in the company, 
their behavior changed—making them more willing to enter-
tain hostile bids or to resist acquisitions unlikely to produce a 
quick payoff.168 
 
 163. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1005. 
 164. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 312. 
 165. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The 
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11, 30 (1986) (noting “basic 
tension[s] between managers and shareholders,” including managerial prefer-
ences “biased in favor of growth over profitability”); Comment, The Attorney-
Client Privilege in Shareholders’ Suits, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 318 (1969) 
(“Management . . . is encouraged to represent interests broader than those of 
the shareholders or any group of shareholders—interests which include those 
of the public and the labor force.”). 
 166. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory 
of the Firm, and Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 95, 101 (1998); see also An-
drei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. 
FIN. 737, 747 (1997) (discussing current literature regarding managers’ views 
towards takeovers). 
 167. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166; see also Schleifer & Vishny, su-
pra note 166, at 746–47 (observing that managers often chose acquisitions 
that served management objectives even if they lowered firm valuation). 
 168. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166. 
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The new generation of corporate theorists again saw this 
very different problem as arising from the separation of owner-
ship and control.169 The solution, however, was not to reinforce 
Berle and Means’s call for greater judicial or government over-
sight. Instead, their solutions would be to bring back the price 
mechanism both within the firm and without. To do so, they did 
not just inveigh against the corporation as a fiction that could 
and should be ignored.170 They ultimately sought to reduce the 
entity to no more than a vehicle to facilitate market exchang-
es.171 
Economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling fired off 
an influential salvo in this effort soon after Alchian and 
Demsetz.172 They seconded Alchian and Demsetz’s findings that 
the separation of ownership and control created monitoring 
problems, which they termed “agency costs.”173 They observed, 
however, that if this apparent conflict of interest were in fact 
insurmountable, no rational shareholder would buy stock. In-
stead, they argued that agency costs were ubiquitous. The con-
flicts of interest between management and shareholders, for 
example, also existed between management and bondholders. 
The financial composition of the firm could therefore be ex-
plained in terms of the optimal tradeoff among these types of 
costs and their associated risks. In explaining this process (and 
incorporating it within the nexus-of-contracts approach), Jen-
sen and Meckling went to great lengths to emphasize that the 
corporation as entity was not in any way special: 
Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships 
among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personaliza-
tion of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be 
the objective function of the firm,” or “does the firm have a social re-
 
 169. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991) (advancing the idea that “investors 
are ‘powerless’” because managers control the firm, and can control how much 
investors know about the firm); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta 
Romano ed., 1993) (discussing agency problems in a collection of writings). 
 170. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 310–11. 
 171. Jensen and Meckling thus defined the private corporation or firm as 
“simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting rela-
tionships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be 
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.” Id. at 311 (em-
phasis omitted). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Indeed, this was the title of their article: Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Id. at 305. 
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sponsibility” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It 
is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in 
which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may 
“represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a 
framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the 
firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex 
equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the 
wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error 
by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motiva-
tions and intentions.174 
This denial of the importance of the firm as an entity 
served several purposes. It reinforced Alchian and Demsetz’s 
conclusion that the focus should be on the incentive effects of 
contracts within the firm rather than characterization of the 
firm’s operations in non-market terms. To the same end, it re-
jected Coase’s distinction between the firm’s external and in-
ternal relationships. Instead, within the nexus-of-contracts 
model, the conception of firm boundaries became meaningless 
and it thus made “little or no sense to try to distinguish those 
things which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) 
from those things that are ‘outside’ of it.”175 Recasting the firm 
this way made it possible to explain how market discipline, ra-
ther than the suppression of the price mechanism, explained 
firm structure. Jensen and Meckling wrote that analysis decry-
ing the separation of ownership and control “is equivalent in 
every sense to comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce 
commodity (and therefore costly) to a world in which it is freely 
available at zero resource cost” and then concluding that the 
first world is “non-optimal.”176 They dismissively termed this 
line of reasoning the “Nirvana” form of analysis and attributed 
the “Nirvana” reference to Coase himself.177 
C. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES 
Legal scholars embraced the nexus-of-contracts approach 
to argue that all that was necessary was to get the law out of 
the way so that the market could perform its magic.178 Within 
 
 174. Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 328. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 169, at 15 (“The nor-
mative thesis of the book is that corporate law should contain the terms people 
would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every 
contingency sufficiently low.”); see also Millon, supra note 21, at 1025–34 
(summarizing developments). 
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this framework, the firm itself and, indeed, obligations to the 
firm as an entity and the firm’s obligations outside of voluntary 
contracts became meaningless. Eisenberg concluded that “at 
bottom the nexus-of-contracts conception is not a theory of the 
firm: It is a theory of why there are no firms”; a conclusion that 
conflicts with Coase, Berle and Means, and “reality as it is 
normally understood.”179 
As these scholars wrote, however, corporate markets them-
selves were changing. In another era, changes such as dramatic 
increases in executive compensation might have been cause for 
concern.180 Instead, this new generation of scholars became 
cheerleaders for critical moves away from the cautious mana-
gerial era in which executives identified with multiple firm 
constituencies and arguably the firm itself. Instead, multiple 
forces institutionalized the “death of the firm” by reducing the 
multiple purposes identified with business entities to short-
term shareholder value. 
First, corporate compensation packages changed to empha-
size stock options.181 Law and economics scholars celebrated the 
move as a way to better align management and shareholder in-
terests.182 Favorable tax treatment of the options increased the 
incentives to use them.183 So, too, did the fact that under the ac-
counting standards of the time, the options did not have to be 
expensed, which effectively disguised what were in fact large 
increases in executive compensation.184 Between 1980 and 1994, 
 
 179. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus 
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 832 (1999). 
 180. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW 
FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER 
CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 142–66 (2010) (concluding that one of the most 
startling revelations to come from the Pecora Commission hearings was the 
size of the compensation packages senior banking executives received); Wells, 
supra note 61, at 319–20 (observing that at the height of the Great Depres-
sion, many questioned the morality of outsized corporate compensation on any 
basis). 
 181. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012). 
 182. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311–12 (1988); David 
I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2011) (“Clearly, long-term, equity-
based compensation can play a role in shaping managerial incentives that 
straight salary cannot.”). 
 183. Dallas, supra note 181, at 320. 
 184. Id. 
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stock option grants rose by 683%, with the average grant to the 
top executive rising from $155,000 to $1.2 million.185 
Second, the market for corporate control flourished in the 
eighties. During that period, one-half of publicly traded corpo-
rations received tender offers, many of them hostile.186 Corpo-
rate theorists argued that the takeover market would police 
management; CEOs who failed to maximize corporate opportu-
nities would find themselves to be the subject of takeover ac-
tions by those who thought they could better optimize firm val-
ue.187 The increase in takeover bids188 had two reinforcing 
effects. If managers resisted bids that shareholders favored, it 
reinforced the conviction that shareholder and manager inter-
ests diverged, increasing the risk of shareholder activism de-
signed to undermine management control.189 At the same time, 
as stock options became a larger component of corporate com-
pensation packages, it also made managers more focused on 
stock price, both because they benefitted from share increases 
and because low stock prices made it more likely that the com-
pany would become a takeover target.190 
 
 185. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate 
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2002). 
 186. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry 
Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 
(1996). 
 187. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980) (arguing that the viability of a “large 
corporation with diffuse security ownership” can be explained by the policing 
of market forces within and outside the firm, “with the market for outside 
takeovers providing discipline of last resort”); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Cap-
ital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of 
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) (“[I]nefficient performance by 
management is reflected in share price thus making the corporation a likely 
candidate for a takeover bid. Since a successful takeover bid often results in 
the displacement of current management, managers have a strong incentive to 
operate efficiently and keep share prices high.”). 
 188. See David R. Meals, CEO & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How the Gov-
ernment’s Policies Have Encouraged the Gap, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
L. 297, 307 (2013) (“[I]n the mid-1980s . . . [a]s a result of court decisions, legal 
entitlement to approve hostile takeovers shifted from a firm’s shareholders to 
its management and board of directors. . . . At about the same time there was 
a push for pay-for-performance by big institutional investors that caused a 
dramatic increase in the use of stock options and restricted stock in CEO pay 
packages.”). 
 189. See Dallas, supra note 181, at 320. 
 190. Id. at 320–21; see also Fischel, supra note 187, at 5 (“The lower the 
market price of the securities . . . the more attractive the firm is to outsiders 
with the ability to take the firm over.”). 
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Third, overall executive compensation increased, whether 
premised on base salaries or incentive pay, and became more 
steeply hierarchical. The ratio between CEO and average 
worker compensation changed from 20.3 in 1965 to 28.5 in 1978 
to 55.9 in 1989 to 106.9 in 1999.191 By 2013, the pay ratio be-
tween CEOs and average wage workers was 331:1 and the pay 
ratio between CEOs and minimum wage workers was 774:1.192 
While the greater use of stock options constituted the major 
shift,193 salaries increased as well, often in accordance with re-
ductionist merit pay regimes that intensified competition 
among managers and created greater disparities even among a 
firm’s top executives.194 Between 1993 and 2014, the percentage 
of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased 
from thirty-five percent to eighty-five percent.195 And together 
with both the greater risk of takeovers and the winner-take-all 
mentality of executive compensation, management tenure de-
creased.196 Larry Ribstein described the emergence of a new 
breed of executives who are the “hyper-motivated survivors of a 
highly competitive tournament.”197 These executives, socialized 
to believe that their out-sized compensation packages are a 
measure of their worth, have “the proven ability to make mon-
ey while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm.”198 
 
 191. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 2000–
2001, at 211 (2001). 
 192. Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy, 
AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2016). 
 193. Executives also faced greater risk of dismissals if stock earnings did 
not increase. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Re-
turns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations can be linked to 
share price performance). 
 194. For a discussion of the move toward incentive pay, see MICHAEL B. 
DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT 
FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 78–79 (2014) (discussing assumptions that incen-
tives would spur better performance). 
 195. Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Conse-
quences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 527, 533 (2014). 
 196. Between 2000 and 2011, CEO tenure declined from about ten years to 
8.4. Average Tenure of CEOs Declined to 8.4 Years, the Conference Board Re-
ports, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news 
-releases/average-tenure-of-ceos-declined-to-84-years-the-conference-board 
-reports-147152135.html. With the economic recovery, turnover may be de-
creasing. 
 197. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002). 
 198. Id. 
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Cumulatively, these changes in fact created a closer align-
ment between CEO and shareholder perspectives. Both saw the 
firm as a source of profit.199 Both linked firm health to share 
price and had incentives to do so. Shareholders (at least in the-
ory) celebrated executives’ willingness to take greater risks, in 
part because they most typically held their individual shares as 
part of a mutual fund or other collective investment device de-
signed to diversify investment risk; today’s silent majority 
shareholders are more likely than in the twenties and thirties 
to be institutional investors rather than individuals with their 
life savings at risk.200 Executives, spurred on by stock options 
and merit pay incentives, measured their success (or failure) in 
terms of short-term fluctuations in share price.201 By the end of 
the 1990s, corporate officers and directors had adopted 
measures, such as “poison pill” provisions, that tamed the 
1980s’ market for corporate control; yet, the changes attributa-
ble to greater use of stock options, increased overall compensa-
tion, and the tournament mentality that took hold in the execu-
tive ranks remained.202 Whereas the law and economics 
scholars had viewed perks such as use of the corporate jet as 
examples of a reallocation of shareholder assets to manage-
ment, the new generation of scholars was more likely to view 
the increase in compensation as the product of a competitive 
market that served shareholder interests.203 
 
 199. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 9, at 721 (noting that not all shareholders 
want immediate profit maximization; some may want to benefit human wel-
fare through “very large-scale, very long-term enterprises”). 
 200. Shareholders nonetheless are a diverse lot with varied motivations. 
Id. at 721–22. 
 201. See Dallas, supra note 181; Millon, supra note 21, at 1040. 
 202. See Stout, supra note 9, at 711–13 (“Toward the end of the twentieth 
century, however, American public companies began to change. . . . [S]hare 
price became a popular metric and stock options the favorite form of compen-
sation. . . . Directors and executives now often run public companies with a 
single goal in mind: maximizing shareholder value.”). 
 203. Indeed, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued that share-
holder primacy marked “[t]he [e]nd of [h]istory for [c]orporate [l]aw.” 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 440. They explained that academ-
ic, business, and governmental elites shared a consensus that 
ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder 
class; the managers of the corporation should be charged with the ob-
ligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders; 
. . . and the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is 
the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests. 
Id. at 440–41. 
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In these calculations, the firm as entity, with longer term 
or more broadly defined interests, fades from view.204 The re-
sult, however, is not some type of shareholder primacy in which 
majority shareholders assert greater control over the compa-
ny.205 Instead, the firm becomes something closer to what Berle 
feared: the plaything of controlling owners, directors, or man-
agers. 
D. THE REDEFINITION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE 
The economic analysis of the seventies and eighties com-
bined with a new wave of corporate law scholarship and a more 
dynamic stock market to redefine corporate purpose. In accord-
ance with the new analysis, the firm as an ideal that has value 
on its own terms disappears. In its place comes a reductionist 
notion of relationships—the firm becomes a vehicle for maxim-
izing shareholder investments and short-term share values be-
come the measure of success.206 
To examine the limitations of this model, it is necessary to 
go back to the questions that Coase and Berle and Means posed 
initially. For Coase, the secret to the firm lay with the suppres-
sion of the price mechanism. Eighty years later, management 
studies emphasize the same thing Coase did—motivation tied 
to firm identity is a more powerful motivator than price—
though for reasons that transcend the ability to command em-
ployees directly.207 
 
 204. What did not happen, however, was an increase in the rights of share-
holders to control management. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Share-
holders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1813 (2006) (advocating greater 
shareholder power to amend the corporate charter or change the state of in-
corporation); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 
VA. L. REV. 675, 679–94 (2007) (documenting unsuccessful challenges to corpo-
rate management from 1996 to 2005). 
 205. Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 6 (Univ. of 
Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-04, 
2011), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1763944. 
 206. See Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 714 (noting that current firm “cul-
ture is characterized by a short-term mentality that often leads to stricter con-
trol mechanisms on corporate executives and demands for increased dividends 
and stock buybacks”). 
 207. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1751 (2006) (discussing the relationship between trust, 
loyalty, and reciprocity); Stout, supra note 205 (arguing against a “shareholder 
primacy” rule and discussing several theories suggesting that price motivation 
is not in shareholders’ best interest).  
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For Berle and Means, the meaning of the firm lay not just 
with the role of the entity in directing its employees, but the ob-
ligations of the corporation to the broader community, includ-
ing other stakeholders.208 These obligations came from the na-
ture of the firm itself as a powerful actor in shaping 
communities. With globalization, more competitive markets, 
more intense ideological divisions, and the resurgence of class 
differences, however, firms do not play the same roles in their 
communities as they did in the beginning of the century and 
they do not depend to the same degree on the well-being of 
their communities.209 
To deal with these changes, therefore, it is necessary to re-
think the nature of the firm in the three roles it has played over 
the course of the twentieth century. First is the re-
identification of the risks: Where does unaccountable power re-
side today? Second is the question of the good: Has the loss of 
firm as motivator become an obstacle to more cohesive and pro-
ductive workplaces? Third are the ugly issues that remain: If 
the firm no longer serves societal interests in individual securi-
ty and community membership, what should take its place? 
III.  BACK TO THE FUTURE   
The firm is dead. That is, the nearly century-long arc that 
saw the rise of the large American corporation, its dominance 
within American communities, and its emergence as a co-equal 
partner with Big Government and Big Labor has reached its 
end. To be sure, corporations and firms of various sizes and 
structure remain.210 They do not, however, play the same role in 
 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 105–06. 
 209. Of course, some large employers continue to have a disproportionate 
impact on some communities. Compare DAN DIMICCO, AMERICAN MADE: WHY 
MAKING THINGS WILL RETURN US TO GREATNESS 3 (2015) (boasting of avoid-
ing layoffs while CEO of Nucor, a large American steel company), with Wil-
liam Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, http:// 
www.hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity (describing role of Wall Street 
in prompting plant closings). 
 210. Major manufacturing firms—machinery, automakers, and extractive 
operations—still exist, of course. However, these sectors now only employ 
about twenty percent of U.S. workers. Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal 
Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 91 (2009). Further-
more, 
[i]n the 1990s, the percentage of large firms in the manufacturing 
sector dropped considerably while the share of microenterprises 
surged. . . . The number of medium-sized and small firms also de-
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assembling and motivating labor or coordinating commercial 
and civic well-being. In addition, while corporate excess and 
malfeasance persist, the sources of the problem—and their so-
lutions—will not be the same.211 It is accordingly time to reckon 
with the death of the firm, as the Coasean,212 Berlean,213 
Galbraithian214 firm has been understood over the course of 
much of the twentieth century, and to consider what part of its 
functions need to be replicated elsewhere. 
This Part will address the two topics carrying through this 
Article. First, we will discuss Coase’s insight about the sup-
pression of the price mechanism in the context of human moti-
vation and ask what remains about the role of firm identity in 
motivating behavior. We will argue that both management and 
labor have more tenuous connections with their places of em-
ployment than they did in the middle of the twentieth century 
and that the reinforcing roles of firm identity and employee 
loyalty now persist primarily in distinct niches that character-
ize the minority of employment relationships.215 The role of firm 
as entity has accordingly become less important in either moti-
 
clined considerably. While the share of large firms dropped from 1.5% 
to 0.9%, microenterprises grew from 86.9% to 92.6%. 
Id. at 91 n.209 (citing Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Estructura Industrial y 
Condiciones de Trabajo en la Manufactura, in LA SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN 
MÉXICO, 2003, 251, 253–54 (Enrique de la Garza & Carlos Salas eds., 2004)). 
The microenterprises tend to grow into much larger entities, get acquired by 
larger entities, or go out of business. The result, overall, contributes to labor 
insecurity. See discussion infra note 237. 
 211. Indeed, a full discussion of the new sources of misfeasance would re-
quire a substantial discussion of the financial sector. See, e.g., Lazonick, supra 
note 209 (noting that since the late 1970s, a “downsize-and-distribute regime 
of reducing costs and then distributing the freed-up cash to financial interests, 
particularly shareholders[,] . . . has contributed to employment instability and 
income inequality”). 
 212. In the sense of Coase’s initial article exploring the firm’s suppression 
of the market mechanism in favor of internal markets. See supra text accom-
panying notes 29–36. 
 213. In the sense of Berle’s and Berle and Means’s classic works from the 
twenties and thirties exploring the concentration of power that made the 
abuses leading to the Great Depression possible. See supra text accompanying 
notes 95–97, 105–06. 
 214. In the sense of Galbraith’s chronicle of the distinctive features of firm 
management during the managerial era. See supra text accompanying notes 
55–74. 
 215. See Declining Employee Loyalty: A Casualty of the New Workplace, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 9, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casualty-of-the-new-workplace (stating 
that relationships with organizations are getting weaker, and some people be-
lieve that “company loyalty is dead”). 
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vating management or securing employee stability. It cannot 
therefore be a reliable foundation for extending public benefits 
such as health care or securing public purposes such as non-
discriminatory employment policies.216 
Second, we will consider Berle’s concern about the impact 
of corporations on polities and argue that with the death of the 
firm or, more specifically, the end of the insulation from market 
competition that large corporations enjoyed, that relationship 
needs to be re-examined. The managerial era involved a public-
private partnership that conferred benefits on firms premised 
on the presumption that firms would serve public as well as 
private ends. The end of this relationship and of the assump-
tions on which it was based requires re-examination not just of 
corporate obligations, but of public ones. 
Third, we will consider the question of abuse of power in 
the new era. Both the reinterpretation of Coase in the agency-
cost literature and Berle and Dodd’s various positions in their 
iconic debate involved the conflicts of interest that arose from 
the separation of ownership and control. We will consider the 
risks of an era that has produced a greater alignment of owner-
ship and control, raising a different set of issues. In this new 
technological age, corporate management’s greater flexibility 
has permitted it to outpace public regulation and unionization 
to acquire greater leverage in labor markets and cross-border 
transactions. Rather than recreate the older model of static 
regulation, we will consider the possibilities for alternative ap-
proaches that increase labor flexibility and mobility in parallel 
ways. 
A. THE FIRM OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ERA AS NETWORK 
The firm of the industrial era, with its dependence on stat-
ic supply chains; a large, trained labor force; and insulation 
 
 216. Gerald F. Davis, How Financial Markets Dissolved the Society of Or-
ganizations, RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA 13, 19 (2012), http://web 
user.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/davis_12_RIS.pdf (“Large-scale employers 
that provided job security, career mobility through job ladders, and generous 
health and retirement benefits seem to have been artifacts of the corporate-
industrial age in the US.”). For further discussion of the relationship between 
the changing structure of employment and worker security, see Mark Berger, 
The Contingent Employee Benefits Problem, 32 IND. L. REV. 301, 303–05 (1999) 
(emphasizing the importance of workplace benefits and the related problems 
inherent in contingent employment); Glynn, supra note 2 (explaining how the 
disaggregation of firms into several, often independent parts presents a diffi-
culty in holding firms liable for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
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from competition, is fading.217 As commercial organization has 
become more fluid, the entity-based corporate theory of the 
managerial era has also given way to a more individualistic re-
gime that, like Justice Alito, treats the firm as a legal fiction 
that can be discounted or ignored, except where it chooses to 
contractually bind itself.218 These changes in commercial organ-
ization and legal theory parallel and often accelerate a corre-
sponding set of economic changes. Large corporations no longer 
depend to the same degree on a large labor force, nor with glob-
alization do firms enjoy the same degree of insulation from 
competition.219 Instead, commercial actors strive for flexibility, 
organizing their enterprises to minimize and concentrate core 
sectors, and coordinate them with a rapidly changing mix of 
subsidiaries or independent contractors.220 As a result, the reci-
procity that existed because of corporate dependence on em-
ployee stability and employer provision of secure employment is 
rapidly disappearing.221 
Firms of various sizes and structures still exist, of course, 
and so do a number of relatively secure positions.222 Yet even 
large and successful firms cannot guarantee their survival in 
any particular form. One need only think of the trajectory from 
IBM to Microsoft to Apple and perhaps on to Google and its 
competitors to underscore the difference. The same firms that 
dominated the American landscape in 1910 continued to do so 
in 1970.223 The firms that do so today involve a mix of financial 
(Berkshire-Hathaway), tech (Apple), and retail (Walmart) gi-
 
 217. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at xv, 75 (noting that 
flexibility, mobility, and network forces have become more dominant, and “the 
main source of value added is no longer the exploitation of geographically lo-
cated resources (like mines, or especially fertile land), or the exploitation of a 
labour force at work, but the ability to take full advantage of the most diverse 
kinds of knowledge, to interpret and combine them”). 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 9, 17. 
 219. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73 (describing the rela-
tionship between global competition, innovation, and “lean” firm principles 
that emphasize innovation). 
 220. Id. at 75. 
 221. See Davis, supra note 216, at 16–20. 
 222. See generally ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS : THE RISE 
OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1970S-2000S (2011) (arguing that the information economy tends to 
produce more good jobs and bad jobs, hollowing out the center). 
 223. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 92–94, 118–19 (citing to Fortune fi-
nancial reports to illustrate the scale of prominent corporations like AT&T 
and General Motors, and describing the security inherent in executive life 
based on longevity of positions). 
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ants in addition to more traditional energy and auto compa-
nies.224 In this era, individuals may well be bigger than the 
firms they head; it remains to be seen whether, twenty years 
from now, Apple prospers without Steve Jobs and whether Bill 
Gates’s philanthropic ventures become more important than 
Microsoft’s business outlook. 
For individual employees, the changes are more dramatic. 
Neither top executives nor blue collar employees expect to re-
main at a single firm. The ambitious see many positions as 
stepping stones in a personal saga rather than as a source of 
commitment.225 Workers have minimal or no loyalty—nor 
should they, when they have become fungible commodities and 
their employers have become transitory.226 And the business 
stars of the new economy are start-ups, willing to take risks 
that, if they pay off, will transform the nature of the operation 
and, if they fail, will doom its existence.227 In this new model, 
the firm has become a nexus of private contracts in which iden-
tity, loyalty, and reciprocity play diminished roles, where they 
survive at all.228 Scholars call the change in the nature of work 
the “casualization of employment.”229 In this system, Uber, 
which supplies automobile rides much like a taxi service, is the 
new exemplar. Uber sets up software that will hook up people 
who want labor services with people who will provide them. 
 
 224. Indeed, the top ten in the Fortune 500 list now include Walmart, Ap-
ple, Berkshire Hathaway, and CVS Pharmacy in addition to auto and energy 
giants such as General Motors, Exxon, and Chevron. Fortune 500, FORTUNE, 
http://www.fortune.com/fortune500 (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 225. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93–95 (observing that “the 
transition from one project to the next . . . increase[s] one’s employability,” and 
also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior; even if the employee 
succeeds in becoming more valuable to the company, the company promises in 
turn not security, but employability both within the firm and elsewhere). 
 226. Richard Bales et al., A Comparative Analysis of Labor Outsourcing, 31 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 579, 617 (2014) (“In contrast to the long-term, rela-
tively stable employment relationships that characterized the manufacturing-
based economy of most of the twentieth century, an increasing proportion of 
workers in the United States today are ‘contingent.’”). 
 227. For a discussion of efforts to capture the entrepreneurial spirit (and 
employee loyalty) within large companies, see Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. 
Vermeulen, The New Firm, Staying Relevant, Unique & Competitive (Lex Re-
search Topics in Corp. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2015-5, 2015), http:// 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2659763. 
 228. Indeed, even though the management literature continues to empha-
size the importance of employee loyalty, such loyalty depends on bonds of reci-
procity that are in much shorter supply. See Hart & Thompson, supra note 81. 
 229. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 224. 
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The infrastructure disappears. The software (and the entrepre-
neurs who design it and keep it going) links independent con-
tractors who provide monetized services directly with paying 
customers. While the company makes money, the drivers 
providing services may be considered independent contractors 
rather than employees (a matter that is currently being litigat-
ed).230 They have independence, including the ability to struc-
ture their working hours and conditions, but no security and no 
benefits. And, as Geoffrey Fowler noted, “There’s an Uber for 
everything now. . . . Heal sends a doctor on a house call, while 
Saucey will rush over alcohol. . . . Dufl will pack your suitcase 
and Eaze will reup a medical marijuana supply.”231 
In this world, the firm as entity has neither a fixed identity 
nor a permanent existence. The meaning of the firm, if it is to 
remain viable, has to be seen in different terms. 
B. WHAT REMAINS OF CORPORATE IDENTITY AND LOYALTY? 
The firms that remain, for better or worse, are subject to 
greater competitive pressures and more dynamic marketplaces. 
They need to be more nimble to adjust to rapid changes in 
technology and the challenges of global markets.232 Within this 
framework, companies have adopted leaner production—and 
employment—systems.233 Firms invest less in employees, pre-
ferring those who obtain training and experience elsewhere. 
Firms also offer less security in terms of employment or bene-
fits to the employees they do hire.234 The most ambitious em-
ployees in turn recognize the need to acquire experience, but 
 
 230. The misclassification lawsuits against Uber and Lyft, alleging that the 
companies erroneously classify their drivers as independent contractors rather 
than employees, are probably just the first wave of such suits. See, e.g., 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (upholding a $100 million settlement and retaining the in-
dependent contractor classification, but having Uber agree to implement driv-
ers’ associations in each state to review grievances); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 
13-CV-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (uphold-
ing a new settlement agreement with both nonmonetary and monetary as-
pects, the latter of which “contemplates payment of roughly 17 percent of the 
value of the $156 million reimbursement claim”). 
 231. Geoffrey A. Fowler, There’s an Uber for Everything Now, WALL ST. J. 
(May 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-an-uber-for-everything-now 
-1430845789. 
 232. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73–75. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. at 94. 
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may view companies as no more than vehicles to the next posi-
tion.235 
In this new system, how do we understand Coase’s insight 
that the advantage of the firm comes from the suppression of 
the price system? Part of the answer is that it vindicates that 
insight. If we compare skilled and unskilled workers, firms to-
day contract out (that is, they use market contracts) to secure 
an increasing percentage of the unskilled labor they need.236 
This outsourcing may be to call centers in India, to independent 
contractors in the United States who provide janitorial ser-
vices, or to temp agencies who supply individual workers. The 
firms presumably make the calculation Coase described, de-
termining that the price mechanism works quite well in secur-
ing essentially fungible labor at a time of international compe-
tition and slack markets for unskilled labor.237 Corporations 
remain more likely to bring employees in-house to perform 
more sophisticated tasks, such as engineering or product de-
sign, that are harder to specify, to supervise, or to divide into 
discrete parts. Companies, of course, are also more likely to 
 
 235. See id. at 93–95. 
 236. See James M. Cooper, The North American Free Trade Agreement and 
Its Legacy on the Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes, 43 CAL. W. INT’L 
L.J. 157, 176–77 (2012) (“We are living, at least in the United States, in a 
post-industrial, or knowledge-based, economy. As the United States out-
sourced millions of manufacturing jobs to Mexico, China, and any number of 
other industrializing countries with abundant low-cost unskilled labor, the 
United States was able to base its economic growth on services and new inno-
vations.” (footnote omitted)); see also DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE 
CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2010), https://www 
.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf. 
 237. While large firms may thus choose to outsource unskilled services 
such as janitorial work, the small businesses that provide such services make 
independent calculations about whether to encourage longer worker tenure 
through greater investment in their employees. Even if these firms do so, 
however, the individual worker may still experience greater employment in-
stability if the small businesses are more likely than large ones to go bank-
rupt, close, and reopen with different management. Cf. Timothy Bates & Al-
fred Nucci, An Analysis of Small Business Size and Rate of Discontinuance, J. 
SMALL BUS. MGMT., Oct. 1989, at 1, 4 (discussing statistical findings demon-
strating that firm size inversely correlates with rate of discontinuance). The 
creation of these companies, however, has occurred in large part because larg-
er companies have chosen to deal with potential uncertainty in demand 
through outsourcing these activities, in effect shifting the risk of future mar-
ket conditions to the small businesses. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra 
note 14, at 73–74 (describing this outsourcing as part of the process of creating 
“leaner” organizations). 
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bring employees in-house where the skills are valuable, firm 
specific, and/or hard to find.238 
This dynamic contributes to the growing inequality in 
American wages and it recreates a form of class structure with-
in American firms. If we go back to Galbraith’s description of 
the managerial era, he describes different groups within the 
firm with varying levels of identification with the firm brand 
and varying degrees of loyalty associated with that identifica-
tion.239 The technological era’s reorganization of commercial ac-
tivities makes the concept of firm as entity less critical for each 
group: 
1. Shareholders. This group, both in the managerial era 
and today, combines the greatest emphasis on monetary 
incentives with the least identification with the firm’s 
identity and mission.240 
2. Unskilled workers. Galbraith argued that identification 
with the firm was least likely to affect the productivity of 
these workers.241 In the production line era, these were 
the workers most likely in fact to be subject to employer 
commands (rather than enjoy discretion), and they are 
the group most likely to be outsourced today.242 
3. Supervisory personnel (such as foremen), clerical, sales, 
and other routine white collar personnel. Today, this cat-
egory is much smaller, with the supervisors outsourced 
with the employees they supervise, routine clerical work 
done by computer, and the remaining tasks often becom-
ing more sophisticated.243 
 
 238. Andy Sealock & Christopher Stacey, Why Some U.S. Companies Are 
Giving up on Outsourcing, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ciocentral/2013/01/16/why-some-u-s-companies-are-giving-up-on 
-outsourcing/#1f368f9a51ba. 
 239. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 187–91. 
 240. Id. at 187–88. 
 241. Id. at 188–90. 
 242. Id.; Laurie Monahan, Re-Organized Labor: Affirming Labor’s Rele-
vance by Reframing Its Image and Merging with Allies, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. 
L.F. 438, 458–59 (2013). 
 243. For example, the typing pool is gone, and the group of personal assis-
tants is much smaller at the same time that administrative assistants often do 
things that require more firm-specific knowledge and judgment. See What 
Happened to All the Secretaries, GREENKEY RESOURCES: GREEN KEY BLOG 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.greenkeyllc.com/blog/what-happened-to-all-the 
-secretaries (“According to one study of the data, the five years since 2007 saw 
businesses eliminating 1.9 million office and administrative support jobs.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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4. Skilled workers: technicians, engineers, sales executives, 
scientists, designers, and other specialists who comprise 
the technostructure. This is the group for whom firm 
identity and loyalty remains most critical, with employ-
ers eager to attract and retain professionals.244 At the 
same time, however, information itself has become much 
more readily accessible; the most valuable employees are 
those adept at finding it, assembling the needed compo-
nents, and motivating those around them.245 
5. Executives or management. Galbraith wrote that “[a]s 
one moves through these inner circles, identification and 
adaptation become increasingly important.”246 
Consider now today’s large firm. The two groups whose 
tenure has shortened and whose loyalty to the firm has become 
more contingent are the unskilled and senior management.247 
And these changes correspond with the creation of more clearly 
defined class differences. 
At the top, executive pay has increased, it is more tied to 
stock options, and executive tenure has shortened.248 Top execu-
tives, in turn, make considerably more than the next tier of 
managers. At the same time, boards have become more influen-
tial and the percentage of outside directors has increased.249 As 
a result, the identification of boards (often comprised of execu-
tives from other companies), top managers, and shareholders 
with each other has grown, with all of the groups placing more 
emphasis on quarterly earnings and share price.250 This group 
of officers and directors, whose income and wealth has reached 
extraordinary levels, identify to a greater degree with each oth-
er.251 They share similar perspectives and often set each other’s 
salaries.252 
 
 244. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 190–91. 
 245. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPPELLO, supra note 14, at 75–76. 
 246. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191. 
 247. For discussion of the impact of these changes, see generally Steven N. 
Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L 
REV. FIN. 57 (2012). 
 248. Id. at 58; Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and 
Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 353, 362 (2015). 
 249. See Kaplan & Minton, supra note 247, at 59, 75. 
 250. See andré douglas pond cummings et al., Toward a Critical Corporate 
Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 397, 401 n.19 (2014); 
Shilon, supra note 248. 
 251. See cummings et al., supra note 250, at 401 (“The ability of the CEO to 
stack the board of directors with cultural clones is key to the new power of the 
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Their benchmarks for success have become more focused 
on the short-term, and their careers are less likely to take place 
within a single company. The motivation of this group has ac-
cordingly changed most, from identification with a particular 
firm’s objectives to a more generic management focus that com-
bines a greater association of firm well-being with share prices 
and individual success with financial rewards.253 This group, 
which constitutes a new elite, identifies much less with particu-
lar firms than either entrepreneurs (think Mark Zuckerberg’s 
association with Facebook) or the technical class of engineers 
and other professionals.254 
At the same time, companies still compete for skilled work-
ers and seek to motivate their employees through identification 
with the firm.255 These workers continue to have relatively se-
cure positions with substantial benefits,256 even as overall firm 
employment has declined.257 Nonetheless, their career trajecto-
ries have also changed as they see advancement less in terms of 
the climbing of a fixed career ladder within a given firm and 
more in terms of “employability,” that is, the acquisition of 
skills and experiences that make them more marketable both 
within the firm and without.258 
While differences in pay have increased between top man-
agement and the professional group, so too have the wages in 
these skilled positions increased faster than the wages of the 
unskilled. Looking at the economy as a whole, blue collar work-
 
CEO.”). 
 252. See Bernice Grant, Independent Yet Captured: Compensation Commit-
tee Independence After Dodd-Frank, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 778 (2014) (“CEOs 
who serve as directors of other companies have self-interested incentives to 
approve high compensation for the CEOs of the companies on whose board 
they serve because CEO pay is set using peer group comparisons.”). 
 253. See, e.g., cummings et al., supra note 250, at 399 (“CEOs act as the 
new potentates in American society and manage their firms as personal fief-
doms.”). 
 254. See WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN THE NEW 
ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND HIGH TECH EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 12–13, 197 (2009) (reporting on the change in orientation of 
executives from a career ladder in a single company to salaries that are set by 
the external market). 
 255. HISLOP, supra note 51. 
 256. KALLEBERG, supra note 222, at 70–71, 78, 86. 
 257. Id. at 92–93. 
 258. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93. The authors empha-
size that this acquisition of experience increases personal capital and thus 
“employability,” but it also increases opportunism and self-interested behav-
ior. Id. at 94–95. 
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ers (particularly men) saw their wages stagnate and their em-
ployment instability increase in the period from 1979 to 2008.259 
In contrast, male college graduates’ employment stability did 
not change and their income continued to increase, though 
those with only Bachelor of Arts degrees have seen their in-
comes level off after 2000.260 
This creates three groups with radically different identifi-
cation with companies: (1) a management elite that views the 
company from without, as part of a group of directors, manag-
ers, and shareholders likely to see the company as a means to 
produce profits rather than as an entity of importance in itself; 
(2) an unskilled group with little job security; and (3) a skilled 
group that management would like to retain. This third group 
constitutes the core of most firms and the group for whom cor-
porate ethos remains important to the coordination of behavior. 
Even for this group, however, the strength of firm identity and 
corresponding employee loyalty have weakened as the firms 
themselves have become more dynamic and employee career 
paths have become more likely to involve lateral moves.261 
Part III.B has considered the distinct paths charted by var-
ious pools of employees, managers, and directors of the new era 
corporation. Part III.C addresses what has happened to the in-
terests of the firm itself. It also offers a normative vision of 
what corporate rights and responsibilities should be after the 
death of the managerial firm. 
C. THE NEW ERA OF CORPORATE INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Corporation, n. An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit 
without individual responsibility. –Ambrose Bierce262 
The analysis in this Article suggests that the description of 
the firm in Hobby Lobby, a description that treats the firm as 
no more than a legal fiction that serves as an instrument of its 
owners, is an accurate description of the shift in management 
thinking and the corresponding celebration of shareholder su-
premacy in corporate law.263 What neither the case nor the 
 
 259. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INE-
QUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 46 (2014). 
 260. See id. at 80–81. 
 261. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 94 n.lxix. 
 262. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 29 (1999). 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 97, 199–203. 
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commentary on it adequately addresses are the consequences of 
that description. Firms have in fact become more fluid, dynam-
ic networks.264 The accompanying changes have remade the re-
lationship between owners and companies, management and 
labor, financial elites and other citizens. Much of this change, 
like the analysis in Hobby Lobby itself, has been unidirectional 
rather than reciprocal; that is, corporate owners have remade 
the terms of the commercial entities to reflect their own inter-
ests, while support for workers has not similarly adapted to 
more fluid, dynamic, and network-like workplaces.265 To do so 
requires going beyond the decision itself to examine the rea-
lignment of public, corporate, and individual interests, rights, 
and responsibilities. 
It also requires asking the question Ambrose Bierce raised 
in 1911 and Dodd and Berle debated in 1930: Is corporate form 
once again an opportunity for individual profit without individ-
ual responsibility? And if so, how should the State of the tech-
nological era respond? 
1. Hobby Lobby and the End of Reciprocity 
With the changes in the nature of the firm, legal and social 
policy have only just begun to adjust. The decision in Hobby 
Lobby, on the one hand, recognizes the changes in the nature of 
the firm, as it has become principally an instrument to advance 
the interests of its owners.266 It does not, however, fully 
acknowledge the implications for programs like the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) that follow. Nor can it. Just as the Berle-Dodd 
debate of the thirties ended in stalemate because the solutions 
to the corporate abuses of the twenties lay outside of corporate 
law, so, too, does the debate over Hobby Lobby’s conception of 
the corporation fail to the extent it focuses solely on the legal 
characterization of corporate actors. Instead, the focus ought to 
be on the nature of the public-private partnerships possible in 
an area in which the firm as entity disappears from view. In 
 
 264. Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 712–13. 
 265. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, How To Beat the Bots, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/thomas-friedman 
-how-to-beat-the-bots.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion 
-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left 
-region&_r=0. 
 266. See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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accordance with this analysis, employer-subsidized health care 
becomes an anachronism.267 
At the height of the managerial era, the government 
sought to promote the greater public good through corpora-
tions. The public safety net that took hold during the New Deal 
and continued through the Great Society reforms of the 1960s 
assumed that large employers were part of the solution, confer-
ring health care insurance, pension benefits, and greater em-
ployment security on employees. Public programs such as So-
cial Security and Medicaid supplemented what were seen as 
more primary employment-based systems and large corpora-
tions were seen not just as private commercial entities serving 
exclusively private ends, but public citizens. Corporations in 
turn expanded provisions of these benefits because of generous 
tax subsidies,268 and favorable tax treatment of corporations has 
often been justified by assumptions that the firms would take 
significant responsibility for employees.269 The history of special 
tax treatment and of federal, state, and local economic devel-
opment incentives for corporations has been premised on the 
idea that businesses will create jobs, build community partner-
ships, and pump revenue into both the national economy and 
particular locales.270 These assumptions are no longer reflected 
in fact nor, after Hobby Lobby, in law. 
Instead, Justice Alito’s analysis, in simultaneously treating 
the firm as a fiction and imbuing it with the constitutional 
rights of its owners, leads to the conclusion that the owners are 
 
 267. Our purpose here is not to compare the benefits of employer-provided 
coverage—natural risk-pooling, low overhead costs, generally high-quality 
coverage, and employers serving as advocates in the claim process—with the 
costs or against the advantages of other systems. The point is one of structural 
ideology: with the disappearance of longer term employment, the logical ques-
tion is whether benefits should be attached to a single job. 
 268. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDER-
AL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 28–42 tbl.1 (2015), 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857. Before adop-
tion of the ACA, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was the 
largest federal tax expenditure, with an annual value of $246.1 billion in 2007. 
David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of 
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable 
Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 681 (2012). 
 269. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of 
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 
318 (2011). 
 270. See, e.g., Randle B. Pollard, “Was the Deal Worth It?”: The Dilemma of 
States with Ineffective Economic Incentives Programs, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
1, 2, 8–10 (2015). 
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the firm and they therefore have rights without obligations to 
anyone else.271 The corollary to the conclusion ought to be that 
neither the corporation nor its owners are suitable partners to 
advance community ends. The public-private partnership that 
reached its height with the Galbraithian firm cannot therefore 
continue, and the focus should shift from corporate rights to the 
vindication of community responsibilities in other ways. 
While the implications of Hobby Lobby go well beyond 
health care, it is perhaps fitting that heath care underlies the 
decision because what has happened to health care perhaps 
best represents the unsustainability of continuing efforts to ad-
vance public purposes through corporate firms. As we indicated 
above,272 the United States to a much greater degree than other 
developed countries has tied health care to employment and 
done so because of the nature of the industrial firm at mid-
nineteenth century. The critical government decision came 
through the tax system, allowing firms to deduct the cost of 
health insurance as a business expense without counting the 
benefit as income to the worker.273 The result allowed the gov-
ernment to promote a taxpayer-subsidized benefit by acting 
through private parties. Firms received a tax break for some-
thing they wished to do anyway to remain competitive in an era 
of tight labor markets, and the government relied on the firms’ 
willingness to offer insurance to advance public ends that justi-
fied the relaxation of wartime controls on wages.274 
The change in the nature of employment, on the other 
hand, is part of what necessitated health care reform in the 
first place, touching off cascading changes many viewed as a 
crisis in insurance coverage. First, fewer employees work in 
long-term positions that provide health care.275 Younger work-
 
 271. See infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also DAVIS, supra note 
5, at 117 (describing provision of social services through employers rather 
than government). 
 273. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can It 
Contribute to Health Reform?, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 405, 409 (2010) (describing 
the shift from direct payment with only ten percent of the American public in-
sured in 1940 to employer-provided insurance covering seventy-two percent of 
the American public by 1957). 
 275. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Indi-
vidual Insurance Market and the Politics of “Choice,” 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
473, 474 (2007) (“[T]he erosion of employer-sponsored coverage has increased 
the ranks of the uninsured.”); see also U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All 
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ers, in particular, have become less likely to have secure em-
ployment or employer-provided health care than their parents; 
yet, the presence of younger, healthier workers contributes to 
the creation of low-cost insurance pools.276 Without the presence 
of these workers, employer insurance costs go up. Second, with 
more employee mobility, voluntary or not, the ability to gain 
coverage for pre-existing conditions has become critical to more 
families as wage-earners switch jobs more frequently.277 Third, 
with greater outsourcing, more employees who would have 
worked in large companies now work in smaller units. These 
smaller units are less likely than larger ones to have a repre-
sentative population and, as a result, may have a harder time 
finding affordable private health insurance. A single employee 
with cancer, who would not affect the insurance pool of a Gen-
eral Motors, can dramatically increase the insurance premiums 
in an office of ten. Fourth, as fewer employees have health care 
and as premiums rise both in many places of employment and 
for non-employer plans, these plans become a bad deal for the 
healthy, and people who are already sick become an even larger 
portion of those who purchase them.278 The ACA sought to 
counter these trends (and avoid what some predicted would be 
a “death spiral” in insurance coverage)279 by mandating employ-
er provision of health insurance, individual participation, state 
exchanges for those without employer coverage, and specifica-
tion of the minimum level of coverage qualifying plans had to 
provide.280 The mandate that employers provide insurance and 
the inclusion of contraception in the mandated coverage set up 
 
Employees: Professional and Business Services: Temporary Help Services, FED. 
RES. ECON. DATA (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
series/TEMPHELPS (charting the rise of temporary workers). 
 276. Kara Brandeisky, Why Young Millennials Are Turning down Health 
Coverage at Work, TIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.time.com/money/3821525/ 
health-insurance-age-26. 
 277. Pendo, supra note 275, at 479 (discussing high rates of rejection for 
those with pre-existing conditions). 
 278. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four 
Key Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1716 (2010) (“[T]he individu-
al and small-group market is dysfunctional.”). 
 279. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Uninsured in America: Life and Death in the 
Land of Opportunity, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 118 (2008) (book review) (“The 
death spiral is a term used to describe the process by which a pool of people 
covered by an insurance plan loses its relatively healthy members, causing 
costs to increase for the remaining members. Unchecked, the spiral continues 
until the insurance plan can no longer be sustained and ultimately ‘dies.’”). 
 280. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012). 
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the First Amendment clash in Hobby Lobby, but the declining 
relationship between employment and health insurance is one 
of the factors that made the ACA necessary in the first place. 
Alito’s analysis in the Hobby Lobby decision underscores 
the rejection of the assumptions that once made employer-
provided insurance appropriate, without acknowledging the 
broader implications. The analysis combines two elements. 
First, the majority opinion reflects the perspective of the seven-
ties’ agency-cost theorists, who rejected the conception of the 
corporation as an entity tied to the well-being of employees and 
community. In language that could be drawn from the Jensen-
Meckling article, he observes that the firm is a fiction and, 
since the firm is a fiction, it has no importance as an entity.281 
That is, when the owners decide to act through corporate form, 
the corporation has no meaning separate from the identity and 
interests of its owners—and the owners are free to assert what-
ever rights they would have as individuals.282 
Second, Alito further concludes that when the owners 
choose to act through corporate form, and to take advantage of 
the benefits state-chartered corporate form confers, they ac-
quire no obligations to either employees or the community by 
virtue of that decision.283 Thus, in acting through corporate 
form, the Hobby Lobby owners can insist on a First Amend-
ment right to claim the tax and other competitive advantages of 
government-subsidized health care for their employees284 and 
still pick and choose among the provisions included in the plans 
on the basis of their individual, idiosyncratic preferences.285 
 
 281. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 282. Indeed, at least one scholar argues that the religious freedom rights 
granted to Hobby Lobby as a corporation exceed those available to individuals. 
See Yvette Ann Walker, Note, More than Human: Modern Expansion of Corpo-
rate Personhood Rights in Hobby Lobby, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297, 
324 (2015). 
 283. As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent indicates, the decision in this respect is 
at odds with earlier decisions about the structure of the marketplace that ap-
plied to individual proprietors as well as companies. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 284. Id. at 2776–77 (majority opinion) (emphasizing benefit to employer 
from the ability to provide health insurance benefits, and from the substantial 
tax benefits); see also Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and Religious Free-
dom: Hobby Lobby Stores—A Missed Opportunity To Reconcile a Flawed Law 
with a Flawed Health Care System, 48 IND. L. REV. 461, 479 (2015). 
 285. In Hobby Lobby, the owners objected to the morning-after pill as an 
abortifacient, even though the weight of scientific opinion is that it prevents 
ovulation but cannot prevent the implantation of an embryo in the uterine 
wall, and therefore does not cause abortion. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF GYNE-
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Moreover, while Alito gives considerable weight to the employ-
ers’ right of access to health care tax subsidies, in spite of the 
fact that they could choose not to provide health care at all, he 
minimizes the employees’ interests because of the government’s 
purported ability to deliver contraceptive access in other 
ways.286 
The logical extension of this analysis, however, is the sepa-
ration of employment and health care altogether, and not just 
because it solves the religious freedom issue. Employers, of 
course, acted to advance their own interests during the mana-
gerial era as well, but the provision of heath care through em-
ployer subsidies arose during an era in which management and 
labor issues were more aligned.287 Today, the larger question is 
why employers should continue to be a vehicle for the extension 
of benefits necessary to human flourishing at all. The initial 
adoption of government-subsidized employee benefits reflects 
the particular constellation of forces at play in the United 
States during World War II and its aftermath.288 The net effect 
of employer-provided health care, however, was broad-based 
coverage through large, private entities that disguised the cost 
of a large-scale public program. Subsequent changes in the na-
ture of employment change the justifiability of such an ap-
proach, for reasons implicit in the Alito opinion. 
As a practical matter, the large firms of the managerial era 
both sought to advance secular, commercial interests and saw 
more of a unity of interests when it came to accessing public 
subsidies to provide worker benefits. This is true in part be-
cause of the existence of a tighter labor market, which encour-
aged greater efforts to invest in and retain workers,289 and be-
 
COLOGY & OBSTETRICS & INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRA-
CEPTION, MECHANISM OF ACTION (2012), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/ 
packages/pdf/health/contraception/ICEC_FIGO_MoA_Statement_March_2012 
.pdf (collecting research). 
 286. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780, 2782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that the government could itself “assume the cost of providing” the 
contraceptives or could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously 
affiliated nonprofit organizations). But see Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, 
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Poli-
tics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2591 (2015) (noting difficulties with the proposal). 
 287. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 42. In addition, given the dominance of 
large corporations in the American economy in the postwar era, the idiosyn-
cratic preferences of a Henry Ford or owners like the family that controls 
Hobby Lobby became less important. Id. at 43–45. 
 288. Id. at 42. 
 289. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN ED-
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cause companies strove for greater overall stability, seeking 
gradual growth to a greater degree than share price maximiza-
tion.290 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively con-
cludes that corporate owners neither have a duty to maximize 
share price (or to act to promote secular, commercial corporate 
purposes) nor to take the interests of their employees into ac-
count in taking advantage of the tax subsidies of a program de-
signed primarily for the employees’ benefit.291 The import of the 
decision is limited as a practical matter because large, publicly 
traded corporations are unlikely to choose to advance religious 
purposes, but such corporations are also more likely than Hob-
by Lobby to move plants overseas, outsource activities to inde-
pendent contractors to reduce benefits, or convert full-time po-
sitions to part-time to avoid the need to pay for health care 
benefits.292 As an ideological matter, the Hobby Lobby opinion 
underscores the conclusion that owners have no obligation, 
morally or legally, to consider the interests of their employees, 
and, legally, they have no obligation to do so even where exer-
cise of their religious preferences imposes costs on the employ-
ees with respect to access to health care provisions designed to 
minimize public costs (pregnancy, which would be covered by 
Hobby Lobby’s publicly subsidized employee plans, is more ex-
pensive than contraception) and increase employee benefits.293 
Moreover, the continued existence of employer health care 
insurance continues to promote class-based differences in ac-
cess that reinforce the impact of employment-based inequali-
ties. Every person requires access to health care at some point 
in her life, and health care has become that much more expen-
sive because of the availability of third party payers, further 
increasing the costs to those who lack health insurance.294 Yet, 
not only do employers provide health care insurance in large 
part because of generous tax subsidies,295 but the subsidies pro-
 
UCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 53–57 (2008). 
 290. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 104, 241–43. 
 291. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 791. 
 292. See Roya Wolverson, Outsourcing Jobs and Taxes, COUNCIL ON FOR-
EIGN REL. (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/outsourcing-jobs 
-taxes/p21777. 
 293. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 779 (discussing costs imposed on em-
ployees). 
 294. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egre-
gious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 17–55. 
 295. Gamage, supra note 268, at 680–81 (noting that even before the ACA, 
health care was the largest tax subsidy). 
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vide perverse incentives to do so in ways that disproportionate-
ly benefit the well-off.296 The ACA, by retaining most of the em-
ployer-oriented system, creates much larger subsidies for high-
income individuals through employer-sponsored plans, and 
much larger tax subsidies for most lower-income taxpayers 
through the exchanges.297 This increases the incentives for em-
ployers to recruit hard-to-get, higher-paid employees through 
employer-provided health care benefits while finding ways not 
to include low-income workers as full-time employees at all.298 
Even if the workers who end up with plans through the ex-
changes enjoy comparable health care benefits, the result rein-
forces employment-based inequalities, and undermines political 
support for the ACA.299 In contrast, single-payer systems in 
other countries decouple health care and employment, creating 
more uniform identification (good or bad) with a single system. 
Moreover, separating health care from employment would 
not only be fairer, it would be more transparent. The existing 
system disguises an important government benefit—health 
care insurance—as a perquisite of private employment.300 It al-
so cloaks the true cost to taxpayers, the cross-subsidization 
that benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor, and em-
ployer choices, that in the absence of precedent-setting Su-
preme Court litigation, are often invisible to employees.301 
 
 296. Indeed, before the ACA, the individuals who did not have employer-
provided plans faced both substantially higher health care costs if they paid 
out of pocket and substantially higher premiums for private insurance (if they 
could get it at all given pre-existing conditions) than they would probably have 
faced if employer-sponsored health insurance did not exist. Id. at 676–83. 
 297. See id. at 672. 
 298. Id. at 671–72. 
 299. That is, it undermines political support to the extent that those with 
employer-based plans fail to recognize that the taxpayers are also paying for 
their plans to a large degree through the tax system. In addition, the role of 
Medicaid-type benefits, which are often stigmatized where they are available, 
and which make many workers worse off where they are not, further compli-
cates the effects. See Sally C. Pipes, The Medicaid Poverty Trap Is Growing 
Worse, N.Y. POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.nypost.com/2015/07/29/the 
-medicaid-poverty-trap-is-growing-worse. 
 300. Gamage, supra note 268. 
 301. In the absence of the publicity attending the Hobby Lobby decision, for 
example, employees might never know that the reason their health plan does 
not cover an intrauterine device (IUD) is because of their employer’s religious 
objection to a benefit other employers are required to cover. See Seema 
Mohapatra, Time To Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: Using 
Corporate Law To Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
137, 155 (2015); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: 
Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee 
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While a sudden elimination of employer-sponsored health 
insurance would be destabilizing302 and health care reforms of 
any kind may be impossible today,303 the time has come to es-
tablish the principle that the government needs to counter 
more fluid and dynamic business enterprises through measures 
that make individual workers similarly nimble, mobile—and 
less dependent on particular employers. A health care system 
entirely independent of employment is, in this sense, similar to 
fully portable pension plans in contributing to worker autono-
my.304 Moreover, the ACA may ultimately speed voluntary em-
ployer choices to drop health care coverage.305 The ACA’s man-
date, which only took effect during the 2015–16 enrollment 
period, provides that employers must provide a certain level of 
health care or pay a fine.306 The fine in many cases is less than 
the cost of providing insurance, and the fines can be used to 
help finance the subsidies built into operation of the system.307 
Eliminating the employer mandate, recalibrating existing sub-
sidies, and/or tailoring the requirements and the fine to en-
courage the gradual elimination of employment-based plans 
could gradually shift most insurance coverage to the exchanges, 
 
Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 170 (2015) (“[A]ccording to counsel, 
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] should be read to protect a multi-
billion dollar corporation against a marginal increase in its operating expenses 
as the cost of observing its religious beliefs against IUDs and other emergency 
contraception, but not to prevent the same corporation from shifting the costs 
of that observance onto lower-income employees and dependents who believe 
and practice differently.”). 
 302. We are indebted to Daniel Schwarcz for this and several other points. 
 303. Indeed, many observers have noted the illusory nature of the Supreme 
Court’s insistence that the government could find other ways to provide for 
employee access to contraception, given Congressional determination to un-
dermine the ACA more generally. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 286, at 
2550–51. 
 304. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 715 (proposing replacing existing tax 
subsidies with tax credits based on individual income). While this would not 
eliminate employer participation, it could be a first step in that direction. 
 305. Rick Lindquist & Paul Zane Pilzner, The End of Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/next 
avenue/2015/03/11/the-end-of-employer-provided-health-insurance/#22c123236 
4d2 (predicting that “90% of all businesses will drop offering health insurance” 
in the next decade). 
 306. Obamacare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE.NET, http://www 
.obamacare.net/obamacare-employer-mandate (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 307. See LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URBAN INST., WHY NOT JUST ELIMI-
NATE THE EMPLOYER MANDATE? 4 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/ 
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413117%20-%20Why-Not-Just-Eliminate-the 
-Employer-Mandate-.pdf (finding that fines may generate substantial revenue 
from employers choosing not to provide coverage). 
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eliminating the employer role.308 If that happened—if all health 
care depended on access to government-run exchanges or to 
public programs like Medicare—it would both increase worker 
flexibility and eliminate the fiction that employer-provided pro-
grams are private market creations. Whether one favors a sin-
gle-payer, government-run system or a more free-market-
oriented system of individually purchased private insurance 
policies, it is hard to justify the continuation of an employer-
based system that provides substantially less coverage than it 
once did and whose primary effect is to disguise a substantial 
federal subsidy for favored employees.309 
2. The Need for a New Social Contract 
Ultimately, the State needs to contribute to a new model of 
the networked worker that matches the networked firm and re-
sets the balance between the two. Silicon Valley provides a 
model. Highly sought-after workers start with technical skills, 
get entry-level jobs that give them experience, move to the next 
firm as they mature, and hope to start their own companies. 
They do so in an environment where private equity funding for 
start-ups is readily available, failure is not catastrophic in part 
because the entrepreneur’s own assets do not finance new com-
panies, and the forgiving job market provides other opportuni-
ties.310 
Silicon Valley is obviously an elite model, but the elements 
that make valued employees better off than the rest of the 
country once characterized a larger part of the country as a 
whole. First, the job market for skilled workers is tight, just as 
the job market for blue collar workers was also tight in the 
 
 308. The Urban Institute has proposed eliminating the employer mandate 
in any event, arguing that it is unnecessary and has distorting effects on em-
ployment. Id.; see also Bob Seng & Holly Fistler, King v. Burwell: Last Piece of 
Obamacare Puzzle?, 72 BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 2015, at 16, 18 (“There’s a 
pretty good argument that the employer mandate isn’t necessary. . . . [But] 
chances of [it] going away without eliminating the individual mandate are 
very low.”). 
 309. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 686–87; Melone, supra note 284, at 
465–66. A complete examination of health care alternatives is beyond the 
scope of this Article, and the purpose of this example is not to defend either a 
single-payer system or the existing exchanges, which allow individuals to buy 
private insurance policies at subsidized prices, but to evaluate the conse-
quences of the uncoupling of employment and benefits—which is already oc-
curring. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 690. 
 310. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 125–26 (describing the flexicurity system 
in Denmark, which facilitates such a model). 
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postwar period of full employment policies.311 Second, the fi-
nancing of new ventures for employees who seek to set off on 
their own is equity-based, not debt-based.312 This means the en-
trepreneur, even if not ultimately successful, acquires new 
skills and experience without being crushed by loans, leaving 
her free to go on to the next opportunity. In contrast, for most 
others, the acquisition of valuable education, experience, and 
skills has become riskier and more expensive. Third, employee 
benefits are highly portable. Pensions systems today are pri-
marily defined contributions systems313 and the ACA eliminates 
the ability of insurers to exclude pre-existing conditions.314 Fi-
nally, the high demand for skilled employees creates reinforc-
ing virtuous cycles: employers who need to compete for valued 
employees offer more to retain the employees they attract. Sili-
con Valley is known for its employee perks that include every-
thing from on-site gyms to the notorious Google Bus that runs 
between San Francisco and the Google offices in the South Bay. 
In contrast, the labor market for the country as a whole re-
flects policies that produce opposite cycles. Government policies 
have sought to battle inflation (even if that means a slack labor 
 
 311. If labor markets generally were tighter, employers would have greater 
incentives to invest in and retain workers. See, e.g., Steve Matthews, Tight 
Job Market in U.S. Cities Prompts Higher Pay, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16, 
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-16/tight-job-market-in 
-u-s-cities-prompts-higher-pay. 
 312. See Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs 
Act’s Transformative Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment 
Bankers’ Jobs?, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2014) (detailing venture cap-
italist, angel investor, and crowdfunding methods of equity financing). William 
Barker has explained the present, somewhat perverse, tax incentives as fol-
lows:  
The current system therefore results in high effective tax rates on eq-
uity-financed investments and low effective rates on debt-financed in-
vestment. This provides incentives for businesses to finance new in-
vestments with debt, and to maintain a higher level of debt in their 
capital structure, increasing the likelihood of financial distress and 
bankruptcy. 
William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destina-
tion-Based, Cash Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 955, 962 n.46 
(2012). 
 313. Just How Common Are Defined Benefit Plans?, CNN MONEY, http:// 
www.money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensions_basics.moneymag/index7.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (noting that four percent of private sector workers 
have only a defined benefit plan for retirement, “down from 60% in the early 
1980s”). 
 314. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 678 (noting that denial of insurance 
coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions is “a practice banned by 
the ACA”). 
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market), encouraged the atrophy of wage and hour laws, pro-
moted trade to the detriment of worker protections, and un-
dermined union protections.315 Over the last thirty years, the 
law regarding responsibilities of corporations has changed, con-
tributing to corporate flexibility (and slack labor markets) 
through a wholesale assault on fiscal stimulus, unionization, 
and worker protections.316 Paradoxically, Congress and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have rewarded diminished corporate invest-
ment in workers and communities with reduced public obliga-
tions.317 Moreover, with greater emphasis on short-term share 
prices and more competitive and rapidly changing markets, 
even executives who might ideally like to provide more for 
workers have a harder time doing so.318 These policies reflect 
changes in which corporate owners and executives advance 
their own interests independently of the firm while workers in-
creasingly enjoy neither reliable employment nor comparable 
ability to secure their own interests as independent actors. The 
result requires rethinking the relationship between individuals 
and firms not only at the top, where the transformation now 
appears to be largely complete, but throughout society, as re-
ciprocal institutions that allow workers to adjust to the new 
economy have yet to be conceived. 
To change these patterns requires changing the interlock-
ing patterns of law, economics, and ideology. This requires poli-
cies that make workers more valuable, encouraging companies 
to invest more to train and retain the employees they have. Do-
ing so requires rethinking the sources of investment in work-
ers. These policies, first, start with education, making it more 
affordable. Second, basic benefits such as health care should be 
independent of employment. Third, unemployed workers 
should enjoy greater assistance in going back to school, retrain-
ing for needed skills, or relocating to be able to take advantage 
of new positions. Finally, the government should serve as an 
employer of the last resort, addressing infrastructure and ser-
vice needs in schools, hospitals, and other arenas that serve 
 
 315. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBALIZA-
TION, WORKER INSECURITY, AND POLICY APPROACHES 4–7 (2012), http://www 
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34091.pdf. 
 316. See, e.g., Frank Clemente, Congress’ Corporate Tax Cuts Punish Amer-
icans, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily 
-southtown/opinion/ct-sta-tax-fairness-st-0529-20150528-story.html. 
 317. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470–73 (2013). 
 318. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 15, 139, 199, and 204. 
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public needs. With the adoption of programs that give workers 
greater flexibility, employers would have to compete more effec-
tively for labor, touching off a change in private labor relation-
ships. If, after all, the firm is no more than a fiction that serves 
the ends of its owners, new systems should arise that allow 
workers to compete in a dynamic, networked world. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has described the broad set of changes that 
have allowed corporate owners to respond to a more competi-
tive marketplace by becoming more flexible in the way they 
employ workers without giving workers the tools to become 
more flexible in turn. In the process, owners, like the Greens of 
the Hobby Lobby case, have become more independent of the 
firms they control, while the workers they employ remain de-
pendent on the jobs they hold for basic requirements such as 
health care. The rise of the large industrial firm involved a con-
centration of power in a control bloc that could use the firms of 
that era to their own ends; the ultimate solution to that concen-
tration of power required the creation of countervailing powers 
in labor and government that responded to the rootedness of 
larger brick-and-mortar entities.319 The solutions did not come 
from corporate law itself, but from outside it.320 
In similar fashion, it is possible to conclude that Hobby 
Lobby is correctly decided to the extent it holds that corporate 
owners can create a closely held company committed to reli-
gious principles,321 and still unfair in the degree to which it 
privileges corporate owners over corporate employees in the 
implementation of a program designed to serve public ends. 
The larger solution, however, requires reconsidering the role of 
workers in a more fluid, dynamic marketplace, and that re-
quires recreating labor markets in which workers enjoy greater 
negotiating power. In the immediate context of Hobby Lobby, 
that should mean separating employment and health care alto-
gether. Employer-provided health care exists because of tax 
subsidies and these subsidies benefit those with higher mar-
ginal tax rates over those with lower marginal rates, those with 
secure benefit-paying jobs over those with more transient or 
part-time employment, and companies that wish to provide 
 
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 115–20. 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23. 
 321. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 6, at 780. 
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health care to enhance their competitive advantage in tighter 
labor markets over those employers who do not feel the need to 
do so.322 These distinctions have become untenable as a ground 
for public subsidies, and the most logical solution is to abolish 
them. Every individual should have access to health care and 
the greatest public subsidies should not be accorded on the ba-
sis of these distinctions. 
The industrial firm is dead. It is time to recognize that the 
firm of the technological era is a different beast. The long-term 
forces have remade the commercial marketplace, simultaneous-
ly increasing competition among firms and allowing the well-
positioned and the nimble to reap disproportionate rewards. 
The solution going forward should be new strategies designed 
to allow workers the flexibility to also realize the rewards of the 
new system, and to find security in ways more independent of 
long-term employment. To that end, the emphasis should be 
not on enhancing the “entity” nature of the corporation, but in-
stead in strengthening the networks that allow individuals to 
become similarly independent actors. The active role of the 
State must be to help individuals thrive in a networked world. 
Just as health care should be reconceived as a state-individual 
relation without the employer as intermediary, so too does the 
State need to engage in a large-scale project to reconsider its 
role vis-à-vis corporations. With a more even playing field, cor-
porate actors may once again find that entities capable of sup-
plying identity and commanding loyalty obtain competitive ad-
vantages in the marketplace as well as in the world of public 
opinion. In the meantime, the price for leaner firms, which 
have jettisoned public obligations, ought to be fewer public sub-
sidies with more explicit strings attached for those that remain. 
 
 322. See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Why Employers Will Continue To Pro-
vide Health Insurance: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act, 49 INQUIRY 116, 
117–18 (2012). But see supra text accompanying notes 287–88. 
